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EXIT, VOICE, AND REPUTATION: THE EVOLUTION OF SPACS
∗

BY USHA RODRIGUES AND MIKE STEGEMOLLER
ABSTRACT

This Article tells the story of a new type of business—the special
purpose acquisition corporation ("SPAC"). The promoters of a SPAC
begin by forming a shell corporation with no assets. They then take the
company public on little more than a promise that they will strive to
complete the acquisition of a target in the near future. We present the first
empirical study of the SPAC contract design, and use a hand-collected
dataset to trace its evolution over the past nine years.
While SPACs are a new form, their contract design borrows heavily
from private equity's playbook. Private equity managers famously (and
sometimes controversially) receive 20% of their funds' profits, and funds
typically last only ten years. From the traditional 20% incentive
compensation to a short investment shelf life, SPAC entrepreneurs tried to
transfer many hallmarks of the private equity contract to the public market.
Reputational constraints got lost in translation. The private equity
fund model is built on repeat business, and reputation is a crucial
contractual gap filler. In contrast, SPACs are one-shot deals. Without
managerial reputation to rely on, investors demanded increasing amounts of
"skin in the game" from SPAC managers, and placed more conditions on
managerial claims to 20% of the profits. On the other hand, without the
force of reputation constraining investors, a supermajority vote created a
powerful holdout right, which shareholders used to exploit SPACs until the
form evolved to eliminate it. Our study of SPACs—by demonstrating the
ways in which parties contract for credibility in the absence of long-term
relationships between investors and managers—thus underscores the
importance of reputation to the relational dynamics in traditional private
equity.
Aside from making private equity publicly tradable (with its
concomitant loss of reputation as gap filler), SPACs' chief innovations were
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in the classic governance mechanisms of voice and exit. SPACs evolved
from granting investors a supermajority vote to eliminating the vote
altogether. At the same time, they granted investors an even stronger walkaway right. Thus, the SPAC story, new as it is, casts light on an old
governance question: the relative value of voice and exit.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The development of a new kind of corporation is a rare occurrence.
Yet in recent years, such a new species has emerged—the special purpose
acquisition corporation, or "SPAC." SPACs constitute a uniquely public
form of private equity fund. The promoters of a SPAC take the entity public
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as a shell corporation and then commence a time-limited hunt for an
acquisition target.1 If a target is found, investors in the SPAC have a preacquisition choice either to get their money back, or to remain as
shareholders of the now-public firm.2 Sometimes called a "poor man's
private equity fund,"3 SPACs give a wide range of investors an opportunity
previously only afforded to accredited (i.e., wealthy) investors: the
opportunity to invest in a fund that acquires a private company.4
The SPAC's developers did not, however, create this new corporate
form from whole cloth. Almost every SPAC feature borrows from the
playbook of the traditional private equity firm.5 The most well known forms
of private equity are venture capital and leveraged-buyout ("LBO" or
"buyout") funds.6 In this multi-billion dollar industry, sophisticated
investors entrust their money to managers, who then invest the funds in a
variety of private targets.7 At their inception, the creators of SPACs
attempted to translate key private equity features to the public markets, and
the law of unintended consequences promptly went to work.8

1
William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Truth About Reverse Mergers, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS.
L.J. 743, 756 (2008). Sjostrom's article describes SPACs as a species of reverse merger, and at a
high level of generality. See id. at 756-59. In contrast, we conduct an empirical analysis of
individual characteristics of SPACs, and document how they change over time.
2
See id. at 758 (citation omitted).
3
See, e.g., Jim Fink, Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs): Will Investors Live
Long and Prosper?, INVESTING DAILY (Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.investingdaily.com/10914/
special-purpose-acquisition-companies-spacs-will-investors-live-long-and-prosper.
4
See Steven M. Davidoff, Black Market Capital, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 172, 225
(2008):
SPACs are a species of private equity: these are capital pools organized to
acquire individual businesses. But because of the general requirement that the
initial acquisition comprise eighty percent of its assets, SPACs typically only
acquire a single privately-held business. Despite these important distinctions,
SPACs otherwise attempt to mimic private equity returns by employing
comparable structures and practices. For example, SPACs utilize similar leverage
to increase the size and potential returns of their acquisitions. The managers of
SPACs are also typically provided twenty percent of the initial share offering at
nominal amounts; ownership they are required to maintain until and after
consummation of an acquisition.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Carol Boyer & Glenn Baigent, SPACs as Alternative Investments:
An Examination of Performance and Factors that Drive Prices, 11 J. PRIVATE EQUITY 8, 8 (2008)
("SPACs . . . provide the public with access to the private equity investments area, which was
previously available only to institutional clients such as hedge funds and investment banks.").
5
See, e.g., Davidoff, supra note 4, at 225.
6
See infra Part II.
7
See infra Part II.
8
See Davidoff, supra note 4, at 225-28 ("[T]he SPAC phenomenon has been publicly
attributed and promoted as a private equity substitute, one the public can now freely access.").
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The problem for the SPAC's inventors was that private equity's
contract was delicately calibrated for an essentially private relationship.
Private equity's contractual strategies simultaneously reassure both investors
and fund managers in a setting ripe for opportunism on both sides.9 Fund
managers must convince the mistrustful wealthy investor to hand over
money, despite considerable information asymmetries (i.e., the managers
know much more about the value of their talents and the venture's prospects
for success than the investors do)10 coupled with the familiar risk of agency
costs (i.e., the goals of self-interested agents necessarily diverge from the
interests of the principals they represent).11 Private equity managers employ
a variety of strategies to comfort the nervous investor who faces these realworld difficulties.12 Incentive compensation means that the manager only
profits if his investors do.13 Requiring the manager to invest his own money
in the fund further aligns incentives by ensuring that he internalizes some
downside costs if the fund fails to perform—the so-called "skin in the
game."14 Furthermore, investors make payments for their equity positions in
stages, delivering only a portion of the promised investment up front.15 To

9
See generally Kate Litvak, Governance Through Exit: Default Penalties and Walkaway
Options in Venture Capital Partnership Agreements, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 771, 773 (2004)
[hereinafter Litvak, Governance Through Exit] (describing the value of a venture capital investor's
bargained-for right to withdraw support if displeased with the fund's management); Kate Litvak,
Venture Capital Limited Partnership Agreements: Understanding Compensation Arrangements, 76
U. CHI. L. REV. 161, 162 (2009) [hereinafter Litvak, Venture Capital Limited Partnership
Agreements] (stating that venture capital fund managers, as opposed to corporate managers, bargain
for their compensation with the funds' investors); Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, An Analysis of
Compensation in the U.S. Venture Capital Partnership, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 4, 6 (1999) [hereinafter
Gompers & Lerner, Analysis of Compensation] (describing how the contract between venture
capital fund managers and investors controls management salaries); William A. Sahlman, The
Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473, 489-93 (1990)
(describing the various components of venture capital contracts, including management
compensation and profit distributions); Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, The Economics of
Private Equity Funds, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 2303, 2304 (2010) (explaining the "fixed and variable
components" of the general partners/managers' compensation, as outlined in the contract between
the general partners/managers and limited partners/investors).
10
Sahlman, supra note 9, at 493 ("In the venture-capital industry, the agency problem is
likely to be particularly difficult. There is inevitably a high degree of information asymmetry
between the venture capitalists, who play an active role in the portfolio companies, and the limited
partners, who cannot monitor the prospects of each individual investment as closely.").
11
Id. ("Venture capitalists have many opportunities to take advantage of the people who
invest with them.").
12
See infra Part VI.
13
See infra Part VI.A.1.
14
See infra Part VI.A.2.
15
Sahlman, supra note 9, at 491.
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prevent the manager from merely sitting on the money, the fund faces a
limited investment horizon; after ten years, investors get their money back.16
In private equity, overarching all of these contractual protections
against agency costs and informational asymmetries looms reputation. Each
private equity firm operates several different funds at one time, and
successful managers expect to go on to raise subsequently larger, and
correspondingly more profitable, funds.17 If a manager wants to succeed in
the private equity world, she must develop a reputation for making wise
choices for her investors.18 SPACs mimicked nearly all of traditional private
equity's contractual features reasonably well but, being publicly traded oneshot deals, they lost the beneficial effects of reputation.19
On the other side of the relationship, just as investors have their
misgivings about managers, managers have their own reasons to be fearful of
investors. SPACs seemed to improve on the risks that managers face in
traditional private equity.20 Because private equity investors make payments
in stages, they may be tempted to treat their promise of future funding more
like an option, and renege if the fund fails to perform as expected or if
their personal financial circumstances change.21 Again, in private equity,
reputation steps into the breach.22 Most private equity investors are pension
funds and wealthy individual investors; they face harsh reputational
sanctions if they do not honor their commitments.23 These sanctions are
potent because of the risk of being locked out of future private equity
investments—and the 20% (or higher) annual returns that the funds often
generate.24 That, in turn, counterbalances the moral hazard risk that investors
will renege.25 In contrast, SPAC managers receive the money up front.26

16

See id. at 490.
See infra Part II.C.
18
See, e.g., Matthew D. Cain, Steven M. Davidoff & Antonio J. Macias, Broken Promises:
Private Equity Bidding Behavior and the Value of Reputation, AFA 2012 CHI. MEETINGS 1, 11
(Sept. 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1540000##
(citation omitted) ("[R]eputation is valuable as it improves the ability of the firm to attract future
capital investments from limited partners.").
19
See infra Part VIII.
20
See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 757-58.
21
See Sahlman, supra note 9, at 491.
22
See Cain, Davidoff & Macias, supra note 18, at 11.
23
See Sahlman, supra note 9, at 491.
24
Id. at 491, 513-14; see also Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel, & Robert E. Scott,
Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1379 (2010) (stating that breach of an informal contract can damage
a reputation, which can reduce the party's chances for future business opportunities).
25
See Sahlman, supra note 9, at 491.
17
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Therefore, investors' funds are safe in a trust account and are only released
on acquisition. Accordingly, managers can rest assured that the money is
actually available and not subject to an investor’s response to future capital
calls.27
In sum, reputational constraints hold the richly dynamic tension
between traditional private equity investors and managers largely in
equilibrium.28 But the SPAC entrepreneurs shook things up: they made the
investment publicly tradable and thus subject to public reporting
requirements.29 Because of the anonymous interactions of the public
markets, reputation no longer constrained either side.30 Cognizant of the
need to reassure skittish investors in this new form, SPACs' creators gave
investors a vote on any proposed acquisition, as well as a low-cost exit right
available for use before any pending deal was finalized.31 The trust account
comforted not only investors, but also managers, who no longer had to fear
that investors would not honor their capital commitments.32
While the SPACs preserved (and indeed strengthened) traditional
private equity's mechanisms for addressing information asymmetries and
agency costs, the creation of a public entity removed a key reputational
check on managers and investors alike.33 Lacking the ability to control the
identity of their investors, SPACs proved vulnerable to new kinds of investor
opportunism.34 On the flipside, SPACs are one-off transactions, so
reputational constraints on managers no longer had much traction.35 We
document how SPACs have evolved their managerial compensation and
26
See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 758 ("[T]he operating company will receive a large cash
infusion because the SPAC with whom it merges will contain the proceeds from its IPO.").
27
See id.
28
See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 24, at 1379-80 (explaining generally the role of
reputation in informal contract enforcement); Sahlman, supra note 9, at 513.
29
Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 756-58 (explaining SEC Rule 419 governing "blank check
companies" and how SPACs, although technically not under that rule's purview, nonetheless
incorporate some of its features in order to provide investor security) (citing 17 C.F.R. § 230.419
(2007)).
30
See id. at 758.
31
Id.; Davidoff, supra note 4, at 225.
32
See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 758.
33
See id.; Amanda Thompson, Organizational Form and Investment Decisions: The Case of
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies 12-13 (Jan. 2012) (unpublished dissertation, Purdue
University), available at http://proquest.umi.com/pqdlink?did=2344790561&Fmt=7&clientI
d=79356&RQT=309&VName=PQD; see also Davidoff, supra note 4, at 225 (discussing the rights
of investors in SPACs, i.e. the right to pre-approve the acquisition).
34
See discussion of "greenmailing" infra Part III.A.
35
See Thompson, supra note 33, at 12-13 (asserting that reputational checks are only
important to SPAC managers in the pre-acquisition phase, as opposed to the post-acquisition phase
of the venture).
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voting schemes in order to compensate for the absence of the ameliorating
influence of reputation. The SPAC experience thus demonstrates the
importance of reputation to both sides of the private equity contract.
The literature has so far paid only glancing attention to SPACs,
describing their function at a high level of generality.36 Researchers have
overlooked the wealth of empirical data SPACs' public disclosures afford.
Likewise, scholars have ignored what light this uniquely public form of
private equity can shed on the classic private equity contract.
In this Article we summarize an original hand-collected dataset, drawn
from public SPAC filings, and use it to trace the evolution of key
characteristics in the development of this new breed of corporate form. We
provide the first detailed empirical description of SPACs, highlighting their
similarities and differences with traditional private equity firms.
Managerial compensation in both cases is incentive driven, with managers
reaping 20% of the gains achieved by the investment fund.37 Although the
original SPACs required only a nominal upfront investment by promoters,
they evolved to require promoter investment, or "skin in the game," just as
venture and buyout funds do.38
On the other hand, our empirical study shows that SPACs diverge in
notable ways from the traditional private equity template, in part because the
SPAC investment time horizon is much shorter—a matter of two to three
years, rather than ten.39 The most notable deviations from the traditional
private equity mold involve exit and voice—the chief protections available
to investors.40 As to exit, the bulk of the money that SPAC shareholders
invest in the company has always been initially "locked up" in a trust
account and made subject to recapture by those shareholders, at least under

36

See, e.g., Davidoff, supra note 4, at 224-28 (providing a general overview of SPACs).
See, e.g., id. at 225 (describing SPAC managers' ownership interests in the venture).
38
See Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity
Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (2008); Spicing Up the SPAC Structure: Underwriters Tweak New
Offerings to Entice Investors, THE REVERSE MERGER REPORT, 11 (Nov. 2005), available at
http://www.littmankrooks.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Spicing-Up-the-SPAC-Structure.pdf
("One of the first innovations investment bankers added to SPACs is management [share] purchase
agreements. The commitment by management to buy warrants demonstrates to potential investors
that management has a real financial investment because if a deal is not consummated the [shares]
purchased will expire and be worthless.").
39
See infra Part V.
40
See John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Institutional Investor: A Half-Time Report, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 837, 892 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("All investors confront a
choice between exit and voice. That is, they can participate in corporate governance (thereby
exercising voice) or they can rely on market liquidity (i.e., exit).").
37
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most conditions.41 As to voice, as originally conceived, SPAC investors
received a vote—two votes, really—on any proposed acquisition. First, if a
majority of the SPAC investors voted against the acquisition, it would not
occur.42 Second, if more than a specified percentage (called the conversion
threshold) of SPAC investors cashed out their shares from the trust fund—
typically 20% in early SPACs—the acquisition would not go forward.43 In
effect, the creation of this second right gave rise to a supermajority voting
requirement for any acquisition.44
Our research reveals that the original SPAC template worked only
until the market figured out its fatal flaw. In transplanting the model from
the insular world of private equity to the faceless public market, the
leavening influence of reputation was lost.45 Investors were free to act
opportunistically—and so they did.46 The supermajority requirement created
what turned out to be a costly holdout right.47 As a result, the most recent
SPACs have reduced shareholder voting rights, making the majority vote
optional (at the managers' discretion) and raising the deal-rejection threshold
to 88% or higher—that is, 88% of shareholders must cash out before an
acquisition fails.48 The SPAC shareholder vote, a key selling point of the
initial form, has thus been largely eliminated.49 At the same time, trust
account rights have grown in strength and importance.50 Initially, SPACs
promised that 85% of investor money would be placed in escrow.51 Over

41

See, e.g., M. Ridgway Barker & Randi-Jean G. Hedin, Special Purpose Acquisition
Corporations: Specs to Consider When Structuring Your SPAC – Part I, METRO. CORP.
COUNSEL, 6 (Aug. 2006), available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2006/August/06.pdf
(describing how SPAC investment capital, held in trust, can be reclaimed by investors).
42
See, e.g., id. (describing how the SPAC's proposed acquisition is subject to a majority of
investors' approval and how dissenting investors can, if they choose, receive their money back).
43
M. Ridgway Barker & Randi-Jean G. Hedin, SPACs – Continuing to Grow and Evolve,
METRO. CORP. COUNSEL, 38 (June 2007), available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/
2007/June/38.pdf ("Most typical SPACs require that the acquisition be approved by a majority of
its public stockholders and that not more than 20% of its stockholders vote against the acquisition
and elect to convert their shares for cash.").
44
See id.
45
See, e.g., Daniel S. Riemer, Special Purpose Acquisition Companies: SPAC and Span, or
Blank Check Redux?, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 931, 960 (describing the ease with which investors can
enter and exit SPACs).
46
See, e.g., id.
47
See infra Part VII.A.
48
This change started with the 57th Street General Acquisition Corporation in 2009. See
infra Part VII.A.
49
See infra Part VII.A.
50
See infra Part VII.B.
51
See infra Part VII.B.
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time, as competition among SPACs increased, that percentage rose to 95%
and even 100%.52 In fact, the most recent SPACs now go so far as to
promise to return to investors more than they put in.53 On the manager's side,
the contract has evolved to require managerial investment in SPACs and to
condition managerial equity payoffs on market performance.54 We suggest
that these mechanisms may function as public market substitutes for the
missing reputational constraint.55
Finally, the story of SPACs' evolution contributes to the literature on
the relative value of voice and exit. Professor Albert O. Hirschman's classic
Exit, Voice, and Loyalty first described the mechanisms by which
consumers or investors could express disapproval of organizational choices.56
Hirschman's insight has been applied in a myriad of contexts, from securities
class actions,57 to local government services,58 to the viability of Delaware's
dominance of corporate law,59 to the federalism debate.60 In a recent article,
Professors John Morley and Quinn Curtis posit that voting in mutual funds
may be a less reliable constraint on agency costs because exit is so cheap—
cheaper even than in a publicly traded corporation.61 SPACs reveal that, like
all investor-protection mechanisms, the grant of the vote has costs as well as
benefits; the costs of voting quickly became apparent as hold-outs by some
shareholders exposed other shareholders—including promoters—to counterefficient results.62 The vote receded in importance as the shareholders' walk-

52

See infra Part VII.B.
See, e.g., Universal Bus. Payment Solutions Acquisition Corp., Amendment No. 5 to
Registration Statement (Form S-1/A) (Apr. 29, 2011) (offering price of $6.00 per unit, trust value
$6.06); Trio Merger Corp., Amendment No. 5 to Registration Statement (Form S-1/A) (June 6,
2011) (offering price of $10.00 per unit, trust value $10.10).
54
See infra Part VI.A.2.
55
See infra Part VIII.
56
ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 3-4 (Harvard Univ. Press, 1970).
57
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty
in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 376 (2000).
58
See Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 476 (1991); Carol M. Rose, What
Federalism Tells Us About Takings Jurisprudence, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1681, 1687 (2007).
59
See Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Shrinking Half-Life, 62 STAN. L. REV. 125, 152 (2009).
60
See Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court 2009 Term Foreword: Federalism All the
Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14 & n.19 (2010) (discussing scholars' use of the concepts of
voice and exit and distinguishing her own).
61
John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and Fee
Litigation Don't Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 89-91 (2010).
62
See Thomas Friedmann & D. Chad Larson, Special Purpose Acquisition Companies: A
SPAC Evolution, THE HEDGE FUND J. (May 2008), http://www.thehedgefundjournal.com/magazine/
53
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away right became more robust.63 SPACs, however, did not merely address
the hold-out problem by requiring a simple majority. Recent SPACs have
entirely removed the shareholder vote on acquisition.64 This effective
elimination of the vote offers empirical support for Morley and Curtis's
thesis by demonstrating that, as an exit vote becomes more robust,
shareholders will tolerate even the complete eradication of a voting right.65
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II situates SPACs within the
private equity landscape by describing the two predominant forms of private
equity, venture capital funds and leveraged buyout funds. Part III introduces
the SPAC, tracing the origins and history of this new business form. Part IV
offers three case studies to give a more textured understanding of the array of
fates that SPACs can meet; some SPACs fail to complete their IPO, some go
public but fail to complete an acquisition, and some successfully locate a
target and merge with it, enabling a once-private company to trade publicly
without an IPO. Part V provides an overview of the data from our original
dataset. Part VI then compares our new SPAC data with the features of
traditional private equity funds, including managerial compensation, the
lifespan of the fund, and limits on the amount the fund can invest.
In general, Part VI reveals that SPACs hew fairly closely to the traditional
private equity template. Particularly in the area of managerial investment, or
"skin in the game," early SPACs deviated from the private equity playbook,
but more recent ones have adhered to it.66
Part VII highlights the two main differences between SPACs and the
rest of private equity. In contrast to private equity investors, early SPAC
investors had robust voting and exit rights.67 Part VII also traces the
evolution of these twin rights. Most notably, we find that as the form
evolved, the voting right weakened, while exit rights strengthened. We
include a case study of the SPACs of one particular investment bank—the
successor to the investment bank that first developed SPACs—to illustrate
that the trends we identify are not merely the result of new entrants; the
200805/technical/a-spac-evolution.php (describing how some SPAC investors/hedge fund
arbitrageurs vote against the SPAC's proposed acquisition, "thereby making themselves eligible to
redeem their shares and receive proceeds from the SPAC trust fund or to receive cash upon the
SPAC's liquidation").
63
See id. (stating that recently, SPAC investors/hedge fund arbitrageurs have opted for
selling their shares to long-term investors).
64
See infra Part VII.A; see also Friedmann & Larson, supra note 62 ("SPACs' founders are
now revamping SPACs' terms to attract long-term investors and to induce shareholders to vote for a
proposed business combinations [sic].").
65
See infra Part VIII.
66
See infra Part VI.A.2.
67
See infra Part VII.
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original SPAC entrepreneurs followed the same trend of strengthening exit
rights and weakening the vote.68 Part VIII then explores the implications of
the SPAC story. It emphasizes that SPAC developers appear to have
underestimated the effect of reputation in addressing private equity's
information asymmetries and moral hazard problems. The form has evolved
mechanisms to substitute for the absence of reputational constraints in the
public market.69 The move toward complete elimination of the vote
contributes to the literature on voice and exit, suggesting that given a cheap
enough exit, investors no longer demand any vote as a tool for constraining
agency costs.70
II. TRADITIONAL PRIVATE EQUITY
In order to understand SPACs, we must first understand their origins.
Although Part III will trace the particulars of SPAC history, these new
entities only make sense when situated in the larger world of private equity.
Developers consciously modeled many SPAC elements after the form's
private equity forbearers.71 Where they depart from the traditional model, the
deviations are best understood in light of the larger private equity context.
First, a word on terminology: venture capital ("VC") and leveraged
buyout ("LBO") funds comprise part of the larger universe that is sometimes
termed "private equity." Private equity, understood broadly, encompasses
any investment in a private company.72 Private equity is also sometimes used
as a synonym for investment entities that acquire both public and private
companies financed principally by debt—i.e., funds that were once called
buyout funds are now sometimes referred to as private equity funds.73 For
clarity we will refer to these funds as "buyout funds," but some citations will
refer to them as "private equity."
Second, a word on this Article's area of interest. The financial
contracting literature has focused largely on the relationship between fund

68

See infra Part VII.C.
See infra Part VIII.
70
See infra Part VIII.
71
See Davidoff, supra note 4, at 225.
72
Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 482 n.4
69

(2009).

73

Id.; see also Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity,
23 J. ECON. PERSP., 121, 121 (2009), available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/steven.kaplan/
research/ksjep.pdf ("The leveraged buyout investment firms today refer to themselves (and are
generally referred to) as private equity firms.").

860

DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW

[Vol. 37

and target.74 This focus is understandable, given that entrepreneurial firms
are a locus of innovation and figuring out how best to finance them is a
subject of continued debate.75 But the relationship between investor and
fund also matters. Many U.S. businesses, from start-ups to established
companies, rely on pools of money helmed by managers that claim to be able
to identify an undervalued company and manage it better. Accordingly,
this Article focuses on the investor/investment vehicle relationship; as
SPACs further develop, future work will explore the success (or failure) of
SPACs' investments in particular targets.
Figure 1.
Individual investor

Fund/investment vehicle

Target/company
A. Venture Capital
VC funds invest in early-stage companies (i.e. start-up firms). These
funds, however, do not acquire start-up firms outright; rather, their strategy
involves investing early, when shares are cheap, and hoping that they will

74

See, e.g., Litvak, Venture Capital Limited Partnership Agreements, supra note 9, at 162
("A large body of theoretical and empirical studies concentrates on the relationship between venture
capitalists . . . and entrepreneurs who run young companies, yet very little is written on the
relationship between VCs and investors in venture funds."). VC funds stage their commitment to
start-ups, preserving the option for the fund to abandon a company whose business model does not
pan out as expected. See Litvak, Governance Through Exit, supra note 9, at 773
("[S]taged financing of portfolio companies and the accompanying threat of VC walkaway
improve incentives of entrepreneurs of portfolio companies."). Both private equity and VC
funds also employ incentive compensation for a target company's management by granting options
that tie compensation to the fate of the company. See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 73, at 121.
These are important questions, but we set them aside in order to focus our lens more closely on the
investor/fund relationship.
75
See, e.g., Gompers & Lerner, Analysis of Compensation, supra note 9, at 6 (describing the
"reluctan[ce]" of early VC investors).

2013]

THE EVOLUTION OF SPACS

861

make five or even ten times their initial investment (the much-desired "home
run") when the company eventually goes public or is acquired (i.e. "getting
in on the ground floor").76 Ideally, VC funds partner with management and
help the fledgling corporation grow.77 Venture-backed companies are more
likely to succeed than the average start-up because talented venture capital
managers spot promising companies and (arguably) provide advice that
helps pave the road to success.78 To give some perspective, in 2011, there
was over $195 billion of VC funds under management,79 with over $28
billion raised in that year.80
VC fund investors are wealthy individuals, pension funds,
endowments, and insurance companies.81 Indeed, VC funds typically only
allow participation from individuals who are accredited investors.82 The
wealth test for accredited investors includes individuals with a net worth
over $1 million or an individual income of $200,000 in the past year, with a
reasonable expectation of the same income in the coming year.83 For those
investors who make the cut, VC funds have offered returns of 16-20% a
year.84
VC funds are generally structured as limited partnerships.85 The fund
managers serve as the general partners ("GPs"), and the investors are limited

76
See, e.g., id. at 5 (stating that VC fund managers look for "high-potential companies"
which in time can be offered to the public); RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE-GLOBAL EDITION 392 n.4 (10th ed. 2011), available at
https://connect.mcgraw-hill.com/sites/007131430x/student_view0/ebook/chapter15/chbody1/151_venture_capital.htm ("[V]enture capitalists . . . get in on the ground floor.").
77
See, e.g., BREALEY ET AL., supra note 76, at 392 ("[M]any adolescent companies raise
capital from specialist venture-capital firms, which pool funds from a variety of investors, seek out
fledgling companies to invest in, and then work with these companies as they try to grow.").
78
See id. at 393 ("Venture capital firms . . . provide ongoing advice to the firms that they
invest in and often play a major role in recruiting the senior management team. Their judgment and
contacts can be valuable to a business in its early years and can help the firm to bring its products
more quickly to market.").
79
See National Venture Capital Association Yearbook 2012, THOMPSON REUTERS, 9
(2012) http://www.nvca.org/index.php?searchword=Yearbook&ordering=&searchphrase=all&Itemi
d=103&option=com_search.
80
Id. at 11-13.
81
Sahlman, supra note 9, at 488.
82
See Robert G. Frucht & Tasneem S. Novak, No Direction: The Obama Administration's
Financial Reform Proposal and Pending Legislation Proposing the Registration and Further
Regulation of Hedge Funds and Private Pools of Equity are Overbroad and Fail to Address the
Actual Risks That These Funds Pose to the Financial System, 29 B.U. REV. BANKING & FIN. L.
157, 168 (2009).
83
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501(a)(5)-(6) (2011).
84
Lee Harris, A Critical Theory of Private Equity, 35 DEL J. CORP. L. 259, 261 (2010).
85
See, e.g., Sahlman, supra note 9, at 487 ("[Five hundred] firms with $20 billion in capital
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partners ("LPs").86 The GPs manage the limited partnership and assume
general liability, while the limited partners enjoy limited liability, but may
not manage.87 As such, the LPs have little to no voice in running the fund,
and, in particular, do not have a say on individual investment decisions.88
LPs do have limited information rights, however: they receive periodic
reports and have an annual meeting with the GPs and portfolio company
management teams.89 Investors generally commit to contribute a certain
amount to the fund, paying a percentage up front and then phasing in the rest
of their investment over several years.90 Notably, there are harsh penalties if
a limited partner reneges on the commitment to contribute.91
The roster of companies in which a fund has invested is termed its
"portfolio," and the companies in which it invests are "portfolio
companies."92 One study found a median of twenty investments per fund.93
Funds tend to specialize by industry, stage of investment, or geographic
region,94 and are particularly visible in Silicon Valley,95 and in the
technology96 and pharmaceutical industries.97 For example, Google,
Facebook, and FedEx were all venture-backed companies.98

in 1987 were structured as limited partnerships.").
86
See id. (describing the structure of venture capital firms).
87
Id. at 490.
88
See id. Some VC funds establish advisory boards, which may have limited partner
representation. Sahlman, supra note 9, at 493. Some also have boards solely made up of limited
partners. Id. But see Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the
American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1088 (2003) (characterizing advisory committees
as "largely inconsequential").
89
Sahlman, supra note 9, at 492.
90
Id. at 491 (referring to this arrangement as a "takedown schedule").
91
Id. (explaining how the limited partner may lose one-half of her capital account and thus
one-half of the profits that would have been designated to her).
92
See Harris, supra note 84, at 262 & fig. 1.
93
Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 9, at 2309.
94
Sahlman, supra note 9, at 489.
95
Emilio J. Castilla, Networks of Venture Capital Firms in Silicon Valley, 25 INT'L J. TECH.
MGMT. 113, 115 (2003), http://web.mit.edu/ecastill/www/publications/Castilla (IJTM2003).pdf
("West Coast venture capitalists have helped make Silicon Valley the focus of world attention and
the cradle of technology-based entrepreneurship.").
96
Id.
97
Jessica Leber, Merck Looks to Startups, MIT TECH. REV. (June 1, 2012)
http://www.technologyreview.com/news/428064/merck-looks-to-startups/ ("The multinational
drug giants [e.g. Merck, Eli Lilly, and GlaxoSmithKline] are moving to partner with venture-capital
firms and nascent biotechnology companies in hopes of feeding their drug development pipelines.").
98
See SVB Fin. Grp., Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in and
Relationships with Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, at 10 http://www.federalreserve.gove/
SECRS/2012/March/20120322/R-1432/R-1432_021312_105539_ 519233900450_1.pdf.
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Most VC firms are management companies that oversee several
different VC funds, where each is a separate limited partnership.99 Kleiner
Perkins, Sequoia, and Benchmark are generally considered the dominant
firms, but there are over 842 firms managing over 1,274 funds today.100
Individual VC funds have a lifespan of about ten years.101 After the end of
legal existence, all assets are distributed.102 With such a limited time
horizon, reputation matters.103 If a fund is successful, the managers can
capitalize on the reputation of their prior achievements, and generate larger
follow-on funds.104
There is substantial literature focusing on the compensation of VC
managers.105 The goal is to align the managers' incentives appropriately, so
they maximize their investors' profit.106 Ordinarily, GPs receive an annual
management fee ranging from 2 to 2.5% of committed capital.107 Most of
their compensation, however, comes from the share of the profits they
receive, known as "carried interest" or "carry."108 The industry norm is for
VC managers to receive 20% of the venture funds' realized profits, which is
taxed (controversially) at the preferential 15% capital gains rate.109 Most

99

Sahlman, supra note 9, at 488.
See Victor Fleischer, The Missing Preferred Return, 31 J. CORP. L. 77, 101 (2005)
(referring to Kleiner Perkins, Sequoia, and Benchmark as the "royalty of Silicon valley"); National
Venture Capital Association Yearbook 2012, supra note 79, at 9.
101
Sahlman, supra note 9, at 490. Almost all permit extension, some requiring the consent
of limited partners, although 48% leave it to the general partner's discretion. Id.
102
Id.
103
See generally Paul A. Gompers & Josh Lerner, What Drives Venture Capital
Fundraising? 12-13 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6906, Jan. 1999)
[hereinafter Gompers & Lerner, What Drives Venture Capital Fundraising?] (stating that a fund's
size and age can be indicia of its reputation).
104
See id. ("Older and larger venture organizations are likely to have more established
reputation. They may therefore receive larger capital commitments than similar younger funds.").
105
See, e.g., Litvak, Venture Capital Limited Partnership Agreements, supra note 9, at 169
(stating that management's compensation is an out-of-pocket expense for the investor, and is
usually tacked onto the investor's capital commitment).
106
See, e.g., Sahlman, supra note 9, at 494 (describing the system worked out by fund
manager and investor regarding management's compensation as "critical . . . in aligning the
interests" between the two parties).
107
See Litvak, Venture Capital Limited Partnership Agreements, supra note 9, at 173.
108
See Sahlman, supra note 9, at 492.
109
See id. at 491 ("In 88% of the funds surveyed, venture capitalists are entitled to 20% of
the realized gains on the fund. In the remaining partnerships, the general partner's share of realized
gains ranges from 15% to 30%. Given the diversity of fund organizers and their differing stated
purposes, this seems remarkably consistent . . . ."); Gompers & Lerner, Analysis of Compensation,
supra note 9, at 6 (stating that, in addition to a fixed annual fee, the venture capitalist usually
receives 20% of the fund's profits); Note, Taxing Partnership Profits Interests: The Carried Interest
100
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funds specify the percentage of time that VCs must devote to management.110
They also limit the amount of money that can be invested in any one
portfolio company.111 VC fund managers also provide about 1% of the
capital raised in venture funds—the "skin in the game" that ensures they
suffer some downside risk.112
In sum, the VC contractual design features limited life113 and incentive
compensation in the form of 20% of the profits coupled with personal
investment.114 Given that the venture capital world is limited to a relatively
small number of institutions, investors, and managers, reputation figures
highly on both sides of the contract.115 Investors have no voice in individual
investment decisions, and while in theory they stage their investment, in
practice investors tend to follow through with their funding promises.116 We
see this model largely recapitulated in LBO funds.
B. Private Equity/LBO
Unlike VC funds, which invest in a portion of pre-IPO firms, LBO
firms focus on acquiring outright mature companies that produce a steady
stream of income, in excess of required expenditures.117 This "free cash
flow" presents a high risk of agency cost—a constant influx of money that
tempts managers to slack or spend on perquisites rather than using the
money as principals would want.118 Advocates of LBOs argue that they solve
the free cash flow problem by purchasing the company essentially by

Problem, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1773, 1774 (2011) ("[P]rivate equity GPs are taxed at long-term
capital gains rates as low as 15% on partnership profits allocated to a carried interest, while the same
amount of compensation structured as a salary would be taxed at ordinary income rates as high as
35%."). GPs also may receive early distributions. Litvak, Venture Capital Limited Partnership
Agreements, supra note 9, at 163 (characterizing part of managerial compensation as an interest-free
loan, which can give the managers a higher return than the nominal carry percentage).
110
Sahlman, supra note 9, at 492.
111
Id. at 496-99.
112
Sahlman, supra note 9, at 488; Fleischer, supra note 38, at 8 ("The GP . . . contributes
some of its own capital to the fund so that it has some 'skin in the game.' This amount ranges from
one to five percent of the total amount in the fund."). The 1% contribution helps to assure a
"favorable tax treatment." Sahlman, supra note 9, at 490. Sometimes this contribution comes in the
form of a promissory note instead of cash. Id.
113
See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
114
See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
115
See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
116
See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
117
Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 73, at 121.
118
See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and
Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323 (1986).
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mortgage, using the company itself as collateral.119 The company is thus
highly leveraged, and the theory is that the need for regular repayments of
the loan soaks up the excess cash flow and enforces discipline on the
company,120 which pays off its debt and then is generally resold to the public
leaner and more valuable than pre-LBO.121 Many LBO firms now specialize
in certain industries.122 Top names in the field include KKR, the Carlyle
Group, and Blackstone.123
Leveraged buyouts of public companies rose to prominence in the
1980s—financed by the junk bond industry—and waned in the 1990s.124
Private equity funds, however, were still purchasing private companies.125
In the mid-2000s, LBOs of public companies once again became popular
and reached a fever-pitch before the financial crisis of 2008.126 As we will
see, SPACs formed as a part of the acquisitive activity of this time, bidding
side-by-side with their private equity cousins.127 By 2009, private equity
funds managed $1 trillion of capital worldwide.128 In 2010, buyout activity
totaled $221 billion (consisting of over 2,000 deals).129
Even while focusing on a different investment sector, LBO funds
share many features in common with venture funds. Like VC funds, buyout
funds are almost all organized as limited partnerships, with the firm serving
as the GP of each fund, and outside investors serving as LPs.130 A private

119
See, e.g, Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 73, at 131 ("Leverage creates pressure on
managers not to waste money, because they must make interest and principal payments. This
pressure reduces the 'free cash flow' problem[] . . . .").
120
See Jensen, supra note 118, at 324 ("By issuing debt in exchange for stock, managers
are bonding their promise to pay out future cash flows in a way that cannot be accomplished by
simple dividend increases. . . . [D]ebt reduces the agency costs of free cash flow by reducing the
cash flow available for spending at the discretion of managers.").
121
See id. at 328-29 (describing how under "free cash flow theory," when debt is used
properly, "a much leaner and competitive organization results").
122
Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 73, at 132.
123
Id. at 123.
124
Id. at 121-22; see also Margaret M. Blair, Financial Innovation, Leverage, Bubbles and
the Distribution of Income, 30 B.U. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 237-38 (describing how in the
1980s, LBOs were financed by issuing "high yield bonds" [a.k.a. "junk bonds"]).
125
Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 73, at 122.
126
Id.
127
See Davidoff, supra note 4, at 226 ("With the increasing prominence of private equity,
the growth of SPACs has also accelerated.").
128
Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 9, at 2303.
129
Paul J. Shim, Private Equity M&A Recent Developments 2011, in MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS 2011: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW NOW, at 347 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice,
Course Handbook Series No. 29607, 2011).
130
Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 73, at 123; see also Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 9, at
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equity firm generally organizes multiple funds.131 Investors include
pension funds, endowments, insurance companies, and wealthy individual
investors.132 Private-equity funds, like VC funds, generally offer to sell only
to accredited investors.133
Funds have a fixed life, generally ten years, with extensions of up to
three years being possible.134 Generally investments in companies occur in
the first five years of the fund's life.135 One study found that LBO funds
made a median of twelve investments.136 Generally fund investors have
"little say" in the fund's investments.137 Sometimes there are limits on the
types of securities in which a fund can invest, and on the level of debt a fund
can take on.138
Early exit is difficult. As Professor James C. Spindler posited:
The limited partners generally cannot withdraw their money
and are dependent upon the general partner to make
distributions. While there is the possibility of selling the
limited partnership interest to someone else, there are often
significant impediments to doing so. The first, and most
important, is that in many agreements, such a sale will often
require the permission of the general partner. The general
partner can simply say no.139
Even without a GP veto, a market for lemons problem arises: why would an
LP sell if the investment was a valuable one?140
2304 ("Virtually all private equity funds are organized as limited partnerships.").
131
Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 9, at 2304.
132
Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 73, at 123.
133
See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U.
PA. L. REV. 1961, 2037 n.413 (2010) (stating that the author's proposal could be applied to
investment funds which "have traditionally been restricted to accredited investors"); James C.
Spindler, How Private Is Private Equity, and at What Cost?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 311, 325 (2009)
(describing how private equity funds avoid SEC disclosure requirements by "limit[ing] its offering
to accredited investors only, rather than, say, placing ads in the newspaper the way that a mutual
fund might do").
134
Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 73, at 123.
135
See, e.g., id. (stating that the first five years of the fund's life are spent investing, while
the remaining five years are spent trying to pay back investors).
136
Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 9, at 2309.
137
Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 73, at 123 ("After committing their capital, the limited
partners have little say in how the general partner deploys the investment funds, as long as the
basic covenants of the fund agreement are followed.").
138
Id.
139
Spindler, supra note 133, at 330.
140
Id. at 330-31.
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As with venture capital, the fund manager receives an annual
management fee from investors, generally a percentage of the capital
committed.141 The more significant form of compensation is a share of the
profits, which is "almost always" 20%.142 Variations in the payout can occur.
For example, sometimes the fund must return a preset percentage (called the
"hurdle") before any money can be distributed to the GP;143 however, VC
funds do not typically have this feature.144 Sometimes the carried interest can
be collected early, although there are usually "clawback" provisions that
allow the outside investors to reclaim some of their money if the fund's
overall returns fall short.145 In a departure from the venture model, some
GPs charge deal fees or monitoring fees to their portfolio companies.146
Usually the manager invests at least 1% of her own capital in the fund,
which some financial contracting scholars suggest is merely a product of
bygone tax law.147 The SPAC experience may suggest that the personal
investment of managers is more important than the literature implies.148 As
Part VI will show, SPAC managers initially contributed little of their own
money to their fund, but were soon expected to put some "skin in the game."
One key additional discipline that does not apply to venture capitalists
operates on buyout fund managers. Buyout funds must seek outside
capital—in the form of loans from financial institutions—before each

141

See Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 9, at 2309-10 ("Historically, the most common
method was to assess fees as a constant percentage of committed capital. For example, if a fund
charges 2% annual management fees on committed capital for ten years, then the lifetime fees of the
ten-year fund would be 20% of committed capital, with investment capital comprising the other
80%. In recent years, many funds have adopted a decreasing fee schedule, with the percentage
falling after the investment period. For example, a fund might have a 2% fee during five-year
investment period, with this annual fee falling by 25 basis points per year for the next five years.").
142
Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 73, at 124; see also Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 9, at
2311 ("The overwhelming majority of funds—including all 144 BO funds—use 20% as their carry
level. Among the ninety-four VC funds, one has a carry level of 17.5%, three have carry levels of
25%, and one has a carry level of 30%. The exact origin of the 20% focal point is unknown, but
previous authors have pointed to Venetian merchants in the Middle Ages, speculative sea voyages
in the age of exploration, and even the book of Genesis as sources.") (footnote omitted).
143
Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 9, at 2310.
144
See Litvak, Venture Capital Limited Partnership Agreements, supra note 9, at 165.
145
Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 9, at 2312-13.
146
Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 73, at 124.
147
See id. ("It is customary for the general partner to provide at least 1 percent of the total
capital."). Professor Victor Fleischer calls this an "artifact of tax history." Fleischer, supra note
100, at 82. "Before the check-the-box rules, a 1% capital interest was necessary to help ensure
partnership classification for tax purposes." Id. at 82 n.25.
148
See infra Part VI.
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investment in a portfolio company.149 This external check on managerial
discretion might serve some of the function of staged commitment in VC
funds—if the acquisition is a lousy one, then no bank will fund it, and it will
not go through.150
C. Reputation
One final non-contractual and difficult-to-quantify element of the
relationship between managers and investors merits our attention:
reputation.151 In a foundational article on venture capital, Professor Ron
Gilson describes the "braiding" of the reputational market.152 The point is an
elegant one: the long-term relationship between investor and manager
comforts the entrepreneur who fears opportunistic behavior from the VC.153
In order to explain the nature of the "braiding" of the two contracts,
we must explain how private equity's business model depends on scale and
scope economies.154 Professor William A. Sahlman explains that in venture
capital both scale and scope economies exist.155 Since "rent, information
acquisition, accounting, and certain legal costs" are fixed, creating a large

149

See, e.g., Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 73, at 124 ("The buyout is typically financed
with 60 to 90 percent debt—hence the term, leveraged buyout. The debt almost always includes a
loan portion that is senior and secured, and is arranged by a bank or an investment bank."). Hedge
funds can also buy this debt from the banks and then resell it. Id. Also, "mezzanine debt" (or junior
debt) can also own some portion of the fund's financing. Id. at 124-25.
150
See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Partnership Governance of Large Firms, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
289, 299 (2009) ("[M]arket scrutiny of individual deals through ex post debt financing reduce
limited partners' need to vote on or seek judicial review of the fund's investments.").
151
See generally Gilson, supra note 88, at 1092 (introducing a theory of reputation and
"braiding").
152
See id.
153
According to Gilson's theory, the contracts between the fund's investors and managers
and between the fund's managers and the target entrepreneurs are "braided" together because of
reputation. Id. The manager-entrepreneur contract cedes power over to the managers; however
managers have an incentive to not act badly or else other entrepreneurs will not want to deal with
them in the future. Id. The investor-manager contract encourages managers to have this
control. Gilson, supra note 88, at 1092. Therefore, the contracts are "braided" because reputation
and behavior in one contractual relationship influences and is influenced by the other. See id.
154
See Sahlman, supra note 9, at 500 ("Scale economies exist if the unit cost of production
and distribution of a product or service declines as volume increases. In the venture-capital
organization, production and distribution encompass raising capital, finding and structuring deals,
monitoring the investments, and distributing the proceeds. Scope economies exist if unit costs
decline if multiple products or services are produced simultaneously (for example, if more than one
fund is managed at a time). Learning-curve effects exist if the unit cost of a process declines over
time with accumulated volume.").
155
See id. at 500-01.
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fund is not that much more expensive than a small fund156 – both require the
same kind of institutional knowledge, deal flow, contacts, and
relationships.157 Operating different funds within the same family creates
scope economies. Again, cost does not rise in a linear fashion, so successful
managers can trade on their deal-making reputation and increase returns.158
Two additional benefits exist: "[f]irst, keeping the venture-capital
management company in existence preserves the learning that has taken
place. Second, managing multiple funds takes advantage of any scale or
scope economies. From 1977 to 1988, new funds averaged less than onehalf the size of follow-on funds."159 Reacting to this natural tendency,
sometimes VC funds restrict their managers from raising new funds until a
given date or a set percentage has been invested.160
The desirability of scale and scope economies creates an emphasis on
reputation that has ripple effects for both targets and fund investors.161 As an
illustration, suppose Emma Entrepreneur is considering allowing Venture
Fund to buy a portion of her company. She has no prior experience with
Venture Fund, and this is her first entrepreneurial endeavor. Accepting the
proposed investment is risky because she must cede control to an outside
investor with whom she has had no prior dealings, and she rightfully fears
opportunism. But Venture Fund's particular portfolio investments are
"braided" with the reputation of the fund's managers for selecting deserving
companies and nurturing them to successful outcomes.162 If Venture Fund
treats Emma's company poorly, then it will be more difficult for it to find
companies willing to accept its money in the future. A bad enough
reputation among would-be portfolio companies will jeopardize its ability to
raise the future funds that are critical to its business model.163

156

See id. at 500.
See Joshua Lerner, The Syndication of Venture Capital Investments, 23 FIN. MGMT. 16,
20 (1994) ("More established venture organizations should be able to access capital from investors
for larger and more frequent funds. Venture capitalists generally prefer larger funds because of the
substantial economies of scale in operating a large venture fund (or several large funds).").
158
Sahlman, supra note 9, at 500-01 (describing how, once scale or scope economies are
met, if costs continue to go down, a "learning curve" is being met in which "[t]he venture-capital
organization develops a reputation that has economic value").
159
Id. at 501 (citation omitted).
160
Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Use of Covenants: An Empirical Analysis of Venture
Partnership Agreements, 39 J.L. & Econ. 463, 482 (1996) [hereinafter Gompers & Lerner, The Use
of Covenants].
161
See Gompers & Lerner, What Drives Venture Capital Fundraising?, supra note 103, at
28-29 (implying that a venture fund's size is tied to reputation).
162
See Gilson, supra note 88, at 1092.
163
See id. (describing how "braiding" functions in the reputation market).
157
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The literature on reputational effects in LBO funds is less robust, but
reputation remains a matter of concern.164 Various scholars have argued that
these funds are mindful of their reputation when invoking contractual rights
to walk away from a deal.165 However, reputation for successful investments
clearly matters as well.166
III. SPACS
The reader is now familiar with the general contours of private equity
funds. Patterns emerge: a limited partnership with no investor say in
individual portfolio investments;167 compensation consisting of a modest
management fee and incentive compensation entitling managers to 20% of
the fund profits;168 accredited investors—wealthy individuals and large
institutional players169—who make illiquid investments, protected principally
by a ten-year term investment, which can be extended, but not by much.170
Staged investment is common in venture funds, and in buyout funds the
necessity of third-party capital for each investment functions in a similar
way, offering a kind of mid-term examination of managerial performance.171
What if we change the parameters of the investment? Specifically,
what if the investment is liquid—publicly traded, in fact—so that nonaccredited mom-and-pop investors can participate? What if they can pull
their money out after committing it? What if investors are allowed a voice
on individual investment? SPACs tell the story of such an experiment.

164
See, e.g., Cem Demiroglu & Christopher M. James, The Role of Private Equity Group
Reputation in LBO Financing, 96 J. FIN. ECON. 306, 308 (2010) ("[Private Equity Group]
reputation may be related to the structure of LBO financing.").
165
See, e.g., Afra Afsharipour, Transforming the Allocation of Deal Risk Through Reverse
Termination Fees, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1186 n.99 (citing Demiroglu & James, supra note 164,
at 310) ("Private equity firms may have an incentive to achieve a high reputation by investing their
committed capital and completing acquisition deals. This commitment to completing transactions
may be beneficial to the private equity firm in a number of ways. A recent study by Demiroglu and
James found that LBOs initiated by private equity firms with good reputation typically pay narrower
loan spreads, have fewer, less restrictive loan covenants, utilize less traditional bank debt, and
borrow more at a lower cost from institutional loan markets."); Davidoff, supra note 72, at 502-03.
166
See Christopher W. Kirkham & Jennifer M. Taylor, Working Through a Workout: A
Practitioner's Guide from the Perspective of Private Equity Sponsors, Venture Capital Funds and
Other Significant Equity Investors, 5 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 355, 360 (2009).
167
See supra notes 85-89, 130 and accompanying text.
168
See supra notes 107-09, 141-42 and accompanying text.
169
See supra notes 81-83, 132-33 and accompanying text.
170
See supra notes 101-02, 134-35 and accompanying text.
171
See notes 90-91, 149-50 and accompanying text.
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A. Introduction to the Form
A SPAC is born when a group of founders, known as sponsors,
incorporate a "blank check" company: a shell company with no assets or
operating history.172 They then take the company public with the promise
that they will soon attempt to complete an acquisition of a target (generally,
but not always, private) using various bonding mechanisms to assure
investors that their money will not be misapplied.173 Most notably, the bulk
of the offering proceeds must be escrowed in a trust account, and are only
released upon completion of the acquisition.174 Going public is a relatively
cheap proposition because, unlike the typical initial public offering, there is
very little for the SPAC to disclose.175 The SPAC investor is essentially
buying a management team.176 Once the managers identify a target, the
SPAC shareholders may vote against the acquisition and receive their money
back, or maintain their investment and become shareholders of the newly
acquired company.177
A typical SPAC is a unit offering, that is, a combination of stock
shares and warrants to purchase shares.178 Sponsors (the SPAC's founders)
initially buy a small number of shares at a low valuation.179 These shares are
escrowed.180 If a deal goes through, they are released from escrow, and
sponsors wind up owning 20% of the post-acquisition company.181 If no
business combination occurs, the sponsors receive nothing for their escrowed
shares; they do not participate in any liquidation distribution.182

172

Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 756.
See Davidoff, supra note 4, at 224-25.
174
See id. ("During this interim period [before the acquistion(s)], the proceeds of the initial
public offering are held in a trust or escrow account.").
175
See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 757 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 230.419 (2007)) (describing how a
SPAC, unlike a normal corporation, avoids application of SEC Rule 419).
176
Because the SPAC has no assets, other than the potential to make valuable acquisitions
and business decisions, the investor is essentially investing solely in the SPAC's management. See
Davidoff, supra note 4, at 224 & n.170.
177
See id. at 225 (stating that proposed acquisitions are put to an investor vote, and that if an
investor "vote[s] against it and follow[s] certain perfection procedures they are entitled to redeem
their shares for a pro rata share of the remaining offering proceeds held in trust").
178
Riemer, supra note 45, at 952.
179
Id. at 959.
180
Id.
181
See id. at 959 & n.187.
182
Riemer, supra note 45, at 959 & n.188.
173
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After the IPO, the SPAC searches for a target.183 In contrast to the
typical public company, SPAC officers and directors are generally not
obligated to devote all of their time to running the SPAC.184 Officers and
directors are often reimbursed for out-of-pocket expenses incurred in
connection with identifying businesses and performing due diligence,185 but
generally receive no salary or fees until after the initial business combination
occurs.186
The announcement of a proposed acquisition heralds a SPAC's end
game.187 Most SPACs give stockholders a chance to vote on the
acquisition.188 SPACs sometimes repurchase shares, bargaining for a
positive vote on an acquisition in exchange for the promise to buy shares
once the acquisition is completed.189 There have also been reports of hedge
funds "greenmailing" SPACs in exchange for a positive vote (i.e., requiring
additional consideration in exchange for a "yes" vote),190 which has
prompted the development of a new generation of SPACs, described in Part
VII. If the business combination is voted down, the money from the trust is
distributed to the shareholders.191 If the combination is approved, the newly

183
Id. at 950 ("[SPACs] are incorporated with the sole objective of raising funds for an
acquisition through a public offering of their securities.").
184
See, e.g., Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 12 (Aug. 31,
2005) ("We do not intend to have any full time employees prior to the consummation of a business
combination. Each of our executive officers are engaged in several other business endeavors and
are not obligated to contribute any specific number of hours per week to our affairs.").
185
See, e.g., Bank St. Telecom Funding Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 17
(Aug. 5, 2005) ("[E]ach of our directors may receive reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses
incurred by them in connection with activities on our behalf such as identifying potential target
businesses and performing due diligence on suitable business combinations . . . .").
186
See, e.g., HCM Acquisition Co., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 84 (Oct. 10,
2007) ("[N]o officers or directors will receive compensation prior to [the firm's] initial business
combination . . . ."); Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Form S-1, supra note 184, at 2.
187
See Riemer, supra note 45, at 950 (stating that only after securing a merger or
acquisition with a private company will a SPAC turn its attention to conducting business for profit).
188
See id. at 952 (explaining how the SPAC shareholder vote works).
189
See Steven M. Davidoff, Behind the Re-Emergence of SPACS, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK
(Oct. 21, 2009, 3:27 PM ), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/10/21/behind-the-re-emergence-ofspacs/ (describing how one SPAC [GHL Acquisition Corporation] entered into a repurchase
agreement with its investors in order to secure a vote whereby the SPAC purchased 32% of the
investors' shares for more than they were worth and gave up some of its own shares).
190
Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to the Special Purpose Acquisition Company
Listing Standards, Exchange Act Release No. 34-63607, 2010 WL 5301044, at *5 (Dec. 23, 2010)
[hereinafter Order].
191
See, e.g., Riemer, supra note 45, at 954-55 tbl. 1 (explaining that in a SPAC, a successful
acquisition requires shareholder majority vote and that the escrowed funds are returned unless a
successful acquisition occurs).
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acquired target begins trading publicly, often under a new symbol.192 SPACs
often use stock to purchase targets, reserving the cash in the trust account for
possible redemptions and perhaps to finance the operations of the target.193
Indeed, corporate disclosures often draw attention to the existence of
authorized, but unissued, shares that may be used for a combination,
thereby diluting existing shareholders.194 Post-acquisition, sponsor shares are
often subject to a lock-up period.195
No special legislation or administrative rules govern SPACs.196 The
bonding mechanisms that SPAC sponsors use to gain the trust of investors
are relatively simple, and largely track the requirements of SEC Rule 419,
even though SPACs are specifically structured to avoid the terms of that
regulation.197 Their relative freedom from regulation enables SPACs to
innovate quickly.198 Indeed, as long as SPAC organizers can persuade the

192
See Michael J. De La Merced, Tile Shop to Go Public in Merger with "Blank Check"
Company, DEALBOOK (June 27, 2012, 10:24 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/tileshop-to-go-public-in-merger-with-blank-check-company/ ("[SPACs] raise money from public
investors and exist as thinly traded shell companies, which look to invest in privately held
corporations that would assume their stock ticker symbol.").
193
Order, supra note 190, 2010 WL 5301044, at *3.
194
See, e.g., Bank St. Telecom Funding Corp., Form S-1, supra note 185, at 16-17 ("In
connection with this offering, as part of the units, we [the SPAC] will be issuing warrants to
purchase 11,000,000 shares of common stock. . . . If and to the extent these warrants are exercised,
you [new investors] may experience dilution to your holdings."); see also Mark A. Bonenfant,
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, BUCHALTER NEMER PC (Dec. 1, 2007), http://www.buc
halter.com/bt/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=239&Itemid=1 (stating that one of the
problems in SPACs is that "management receives 20% of the SPAC equity to find a deal, diluting
the public shareholders").
195
See, e.g., HCM Acquisition Co., Form S-1, supra note 186, at 1; see also Legal Alert:
The SPAC Phenomenon: A Discussion of the Background, Structure and Recent Developments
Involving Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, SUTHERLAND ASBILL & BRENNAN LLP, 7 (July
17, 2006), http://www.sutherland.com/files/News/74ae02a0-d2b5-42cb-9655-93110fc3be4f
/Presentation/NewsAttachment/deb8e907-69d8-43d5-a6d0-8814b81cf32a/The%20SPAC%20 Phen
omenin%20-%20A%20Discussion%20of%20the%20Background,%20Structure%20and% 20Recent
%20Developments%20Involving%20S.pdf (defining a "lock-up agreement" as one in which the
SPAC's sponsors, in the post-acquisition phase, agree to not sell their shares for a specified time
period).
196
See Riemer, supra note 45, at 933 (describing how SPACs are "no more regulated than
traditional public offerings").
197
See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 757-58 (describing how a SPAC avoids application of
Rule 419 because its IPO well surpasses the amount necessary to be considered a "blank check
company" by the SEC, but nevertheless mimics some of Rule 419's requirements so that investors
will want to join the enterprise).
198
See Riemer, supra note 45, at 965 ("Permitting SPACs to continue operating without
additional regulation will allow the SPAC structure to remain dynamic and adaptive.").
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SEC to acquiesce, changes can occur in a matter of months.199 Because of
the uniquely uniform structure of the underlying business (essentially an
empty shell), we are able to compare SPACs' voting schemes, investor
protections, and outcomes, free from the confounding variables (e.g.,
differing industry types, capital structure) of the typical IPO.200
In a nutshell, SPACs can be seen as a tidy solution to the problem of
the high cost of accessing the public markets.201 They create value for a
variety of market participants.202 To retail investors they provide a sort of
poor man's private equity fund—a chance to finance a crack management
team's hunt for an undervalued private company and get in on the cheap.203
They allow a management team to raise funds from the public to finance the
quest for a target.204 Finally, they give existing companies another path to
liquidity and the capital markets, allowing them to bypass the costly process
of going public while maintaining their autonomy in a way they could not if
acquired by private equity or a strategic acquirer.205
We find that a number of contractual constraints that were attractive to
initial SPAC investors made the ultimate acquisition more difficult, and
therefore evolved over time.206 In particular, a provision that granted 20% of
shares an effective veto over the acquisition created the potential for holdup
that hedge fund arbitrageurs learned to exploit.207 Recognition of this cost

199
See id. (describing how, presently, SPACs have presented no legal problems and how,
therefore, their "innovation and creativity" should be left alone to thrive); see also Jayson Caruso,
Special Purpose Acquisition Company (SPAC) Funding Opportunities, EVANCARMICHAEL.COM,
http://www.evancarmichael.com/Small-Business-Loans/571/SPECIAL-PURPOSE-ACQUISITION-COMPANY-SPAC---FUNDING-OPPORTUNITIES.html ("SPACs . . . raise money faster than
private equity funds.").
200
See Riemer, supra note 45, at 933 & n.11 (describing the essential emptiness of a SPAC).
201
Id. at 966 ("SPACs are uniquely situated to take companies public that otherwise could
not.").
202
See id. ("While the fraudulent blank checks offerings of the 1980s destroyed capital,
SPACs make a positive contribution to domestic capital formation.").
203
See, e.g., id. (explaining how SPACs can offer advantages that traditional private
equity cannot).
204
See Riemer, supra note 45, at 966 ("SPACs present investors with the unique
opportunity to invest in a management team with a proven track record and to participate in a
private-equity style venture in a safer and more liquid manner.").
205
See id. (describing how a SPAC provides a small private firm a pathway to a public
exchange of its shares).
206
See Order, supra note 190, 2010 WL 5301044, at *5.
207
See id. at *5-*7 (explaining the problem of "greenmailing"); see also Joseph R. Magnas,
A New SPAC Structure May Lead to Renewed Interest in SPAC Offerings, 5 BLOOMBERG LAW
REPORTS—MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 1, 3 (8th ed. 2011), available at http://www.mofo.com/
files/Uploads/Images/110401-A-New-SPAC-Structure-May-Lead-to-Renewed-Interest-in-SPAC-
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has recently led to major changes in the ability of shareholders to
disapprove of a proposed business combination, ultimately resulting in the
loss of the vote entirely.208 But before one can appreciate the rapid changes
the SPAC has undergone, one must understand its origins.
B. How SPACs Developed
SPACs' precursors were blank check companies that sprang up in the
1980s under the somewhat unseemly circumstances associated with "pumpand-dump" schemes.209 A blank check company is one whose stated purpose
is to merge with a yet-to-be-identified target.210 Most of the blank check
company's stock would be distributed to the underwriter and its associates
and, in problematic cases, the brokerage would disseminate false reports
about a profitable upcoming merger, thereby "pumping up" the stock.211 The
insiders would then "dump" the stock, leaving it virtually worthless when the
vaunted merger failed to materialize.212
The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act
of 1990 largely shut down these fraudulent blank check companies of the
1980s.213 This Act required the SEC to promulgate rules regarding blank
check companies.214 The SEC responded with Rule 419, which defines a
blank check company as one that:
(i) Is a development stage company that has no specific
business plan or purpose or has indicated that its business plan
is to engage in a merger or acquisition with an unidentified
company or companies, or other entity or person; and

Offerings.pdf ("[T]he charter documents of many SPACs formed prior to 2010 provide that the
SPACs may not complete an acquisition if holders of a fixed number of the outstanding shares of
common stock (generally 20% to 30%) vote against the acquisition.").
208
See infra Part VII.A.
209
See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 756 & n.87 (describing how the "pump and dump"
schemes led to new federal laws).
210
See id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 617, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1990)) (defining "blank
check company").
211
See id. at 756 n.87 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 617) (describing how defrauders "pump up"
the stock by lying about its value to potential investors).
212
See id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 617) (describing how after the price has risen,
defrauders then "unload" their shares).
213
See Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-429, §§ 501-510, 104 Stat. 931,
951-58 (1990).
214
Riemer, supra note 45, at 941-42.
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(ii) Is issuing "penny stock," as defined in Rule 3a51-1 (17
C.F.R. 240.3a51-1) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
("Exchange Act").215
Penny stock is in turn defined as stock that has a price of less than $4
per share, and whose company market value is less than $5 million, among
other criteria.216
A little more than a decade after the passage of the Penny Stock
Reform Act, a banker named David Nussbaum217 created a new business
form that melded the basic structure of the blank check company with the
protective principles of Rule 419.218 He introduced the form in the 1990s,
and twelve of his thirteen SPACs went public and completed acquisitions
during that period—all relatively small-scale.219 With the internet bubble of
the late 1990s, it became easy for private companies simply to go public on
their own, and the form was abandoned.220
SPACs avoid the reach of Rule 419 because, although their business
plan involves a future unidentified merger, they do not issue penny stock; if
their IPO is successful, the proceeds are comfortably over the $5 million
threshold, and always priced higher than $4 per share.221 The requirements
of Rule 419 are still worth describing, however, because SPACs track many
of them.222 Rule 419 requires that the securities offered in connection with a
blank check offering, and the gross proceeds of the offering, be deposited
into an escrow account (after deductions for underwriting
commissions, expenses, and dealer allowances) and invested in liquid
government-backed securities.223 It requires that interest on these funds also

215

17 C.F.R. §§ 230.419(a)(2)(i)-(ii) (2011).
Id. § 240.3a51-1(a).
217
See Riemer, supra note 45, at 931 n.5, 945. Nussbaum at the time headed GKN
Securities Corporation, but left it to found EarlyBirdCapital, Inc., which we study in Part VII.C.
See id. at 931 n.5, 948 n.110.
218
Id. at 945-46.
219
See id. at 945-47.
220
See Riemer, supra note 45, at 946.
221
See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 757-58 ("[P]ost-IPO, SPACs easily exceed the $5,000,000
net tangible assets threshold given they have no operations and therefore minimal liabilities.").
222
See id. at 758 ("Although SPACs are exempt from Rule 419 compliance, they
nonetheless voluntarily incorporate a number of Rule 419-type provisions in their IPO terms in
order to attract investors.").
223
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.419(b)(2)(i)-(iv) (2011) (requiring offering proceeds to be invested
in a "deposit," as defined in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act; in "[s]ecurities of any open-end
investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940; or [in] . . . [s]ecurities
that are direct obligations of, or obligations guaranteed as to principal or interest by, the United
216
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be held in an escrow or trust account, and provides that the company may
receive up to 10% of the proceeds remaining after expenses are
deducted.224 The funds are released upon execution of an agreement for the
acquisition of a business or line of businesses where the fair value
represents at least 80% of the maximum offering proceeds.225 Importantly,
under Rule 419, shares do not trade on the open market until the
acquisition.226 The company must disclose: (1) the financial statements of
the company and target, (2) the amount of gross offering proceeds, (3) the
amount paid for underwriting, (4) the amount remaining in the trust account,
and (5) the amount, use, and application of the funds paid to the company,
officers, directors, promoters, and controlling shareholders.227 Each
purchaser then receives a prospectus, and has twenty to forty-five business
days to notify the company that she chooses to remain an investor; if not, she
receives back her pro rata share.228 Funds must be returned if no acquisition
occurs within eighteen months.229 Developers of SPACs purposefully
modeled their features on Rule 419's protective features, with the key
distinction that the stock would trade as soon as the vehicle went public.230
Some readers may associate SPACs with the reverse mergers that have
recently made headlines.231 Reverse mergers, however, are a different
animal. In a typical reverse merger, a corporation looking to go public on
the cheap merges with a publicly traded shell corporation—an entity that, for
example, previously sold all of its assets but remained publicly traded.232
Several Chinese companies went public by being acquired via reverse
merger and were subsequently revealed to have questionable accounting
practices.233 SPACs, in contrast, disclose material information about the

States").

224

Id. §§ 230.419(b)(2)(v)-(vi).
Id. § 230.419(e)(1).
226
Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 757 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 230.419(b)(3)) ("Rule
419 . . . [p]rohibits trading of the [blank check company's] securities by requiring them to be held
in an escrow or trust account until consummation of an acquisition . . . .").
227
17 C.F.R. § 230.419(e)(1).
228
Id. §§ 230.419(e)(2)(i)-(ii).
229
Id. § 230.419(e)(2)(iv).
230
Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 758.
231
See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
232
See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 743.
233
Nanette Byrnes & Lynnley Browning, Special Report: China's Shortcut to Wall Street,
REUTERS (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/01/us-shell-china-idUSTRE7702S
520110801; see also Linette Lopez, Listing A Sketchy Chinese Company In The US Sounds Pretty
Easy, BUSINESSS INSIDER, Dec. 12, 2012, available at http://www.businessinsider.com/chinesecompanies-and-reverse-mergers-2012-12.
225
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target before acquisition, and the SEC reviews all of these disclosures.234
One might even consider SPACs to be reverse mergers "done right."
The second wave of SPACs began in May 2003, when
EarlyBirdCapital, an investment bank founded by the creator of SPACs,
David Nussbaum,235 filed an S-1 for a SPAC named Millstream Acquisition
Corp.236 Millstream went public in August 2003 and acquired
NationsHealth, LLC in March 2004.237 Thereafter, the number of SPACs
grew steadily in number until July 1, 2005, when the American Stock
Exchange ("AMEX") began to list them on its exchange.238 By 2007, SPACs
made up almost 25% of all U.S. IPOs.239 The New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE") and NASDAQ allowed SPACs to list in 2008,240 but the financial
crisis meant that very few SPACs were formed after the second quarter of
2008.241 The form seemed close to moribund, with no IPOs in all of 2008.242

234

See Bonenfant, supra note 194, at *2 ("SPAC managements refrain from looking for
prospective acquisition targets until the IPO is completed, because if a SPAC identifies a target
prior to filing the registration statement, then the SEC will require the SPAC to disclose significant
information about the target even though the SPAC and target may not ultimately consummate a
transaction.").
235
See Management, EARLYBIRDCAPITAL, http://www.earlybirdcapital.com/management.
html (last visited Oct. 7, 2011) ("Mr. Nussbaum was the innovative force behind the creation of the
Special Purpose Acquisition Corp. ("SPAC") financing product."); see also supra notes 217-20 and
accompanying text (describing Mr. Nussbaum and the origins of the SPAC).
236
See MillStream Acquisition Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (May 19, 2003).
237
Edward Mason & Alexander Soule, 'Blank Check' Investment Co. Files for IPO,
BOSTON BUS. J. (July 11, 2005), http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/stories/2005/07/11/story4.html;
Millstream Acquisition Corporation Completes Initial Public Offering, BUSINESSWIRE (Aug. 28,
2003), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20030828005453/en/ Millstream-AcquisitionCorporation-Completes-Initial-Public-Offering (stating that Millstream made known on August 28,
2003 that it had completed its IPO).
238
See James S. Murray, The Regulation and Pricing of Special Purpose Acquisition
Corporation IPOs 1, 7 (Jan. 24, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1746530. We found no announcement of a policy change on the
part of AMEX to permit SPACs; it appears that AMEX simply began to permit them to do so. See
id.; American Stock Exchange Lists Units of Courtside Acquisition, PR NEWSWIRE (July 1, 2005),
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/American+Stock+Exchange+ Lists+Units+of+Courtside+Acquisi
tion...-a0133708234 (listing Courtside Acquisition Corp. as the first SPAC to be listed on AMEX).
Because Services Acquisition Corporation filed an F-1 as a foreign issuer, it is not included in our
dataset.
239
Boyer & Baigent, supra note 4, at 8.
240
See Murray, supra note 238, at 1.
241
See Floyd Wittlin & Kristen Ferris, Can the SPAC Make It Back? Structural Changes,
Including Elimination of the Stockholder Vote to Approve an Initial Acquisition, May Help Renew
Interest in SPACs, 4 BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS—MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 1 (2010), available
at http://www.bingham.com/Publications/Files/2010/12/Can-the-SPAC-Make-It-Back-StructuralChanges-Including-Eliminating-the-Stockholder-Vote-to-Approve-an-Initial-Acquisition-May.
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In the post-crisis period, SPACs have resurged with twenty-five preliminary
prospectuses filed in between 2010 through 2011, and eleven IPOs.243
IV. A TALE OF THREE SPACS
Some SPACs succeed—that is, they go public and complete
acquisitions.244 Others fail to locate a target or, having found one, fail to gain
shareholder approval.245 Still other SPACs do not even make it to market.246
Before describing our data, we offer three case studies to give the reader a
sense of how SPACs work in the real world.
Filed but failed to go public. HCM Acquisition Company ("HCM")
filed its initial registration statement on October 10, 2007.247 It planned to
sell 25 million units at $10 per unit, for an aggregate of $250 million.248 Its
prospectus did not single out a particular industry, but rather focused on
"industries and target businesses in the United States and Europe that may
provide significant opportunity for growth."249 It proposed to be listed on the
AMEX.250 Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. was its underwriter.251
The sole member of HCM's founding stockholder, HCM Acquisition
Holdings, LLC, was Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("Highland"),
whose CEO James D. Dondero, was also CEO of the SPAC.252 Highland
was described as a "manager of assets in niche markets and complex areas
including distressed investing (predominantly control-oriented), corporate
credit, real estate, and equities."253 Basically, the SPAC management team
consisted of Highland people using Highland advisors.254 The SPAC stated:
"Our investment philosophy will be based on the strategies employed by
[Highland and its affiliates, or the "Highland Group"] which reflect the
private equity and control distressed investing experience of its senior
management."255 It entered into a "right of first review" agreement with
242

Id.
See Magnas, supra note 207, at 2.
244
See infra notes 298-320.
245
See infra notes 264-97.
246
See infra notes 247-63 and accompanying text.
247
HCM Acquisition Co., Form S-1, supra note 186, at i.
248
Id.
249
Id.
250
Id.
251
HCM Acquisition Co., Form S-1, supra note 186, at 109.
252
Id. at 1.
253
Id.
254
See id. at 1-2.
255
HCM Acquisition Co., Form S-1, supra note 186, at 3.
243
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Highland, whereby any business opportunities Highland Group
encountered valued at $200 million or more would be submitted first to
HCM.256 Highland and Dondero entered into non-competes, providing they
would not work with another blank check company.257 Highland was to be
repaid $200,000 for offering-related and organizational expenses, plus
$10,000 per month for office space and administrative support.258 The
prospectus discussed the AMEX requirement that independent directors
comprise a majority of the board, and it stated that the company had "agreed
not to enter into our initial business combination with any entity in which
any of our initial stockholders, officers, directors or the Highland Group or
its affiliates has a financial interest."259 It filed several amendments,
including one on November 21, 2007, disclosing forms of stock
certificates, bylaws, charter, indemnity agreements, and many other
corporate organizational documents.260 The most recent amendment was on
May 23, 2008.261 The SPAC ceased making filings, and has never issued
shares to the public.262 The registration statement has never been withdrawn,
as was the case for fifty-seven of those ninety-three SPACs that did not go
public.263
Went public and liquidated. Alpha Security Group Corp. ("Alpha
Security") filed an S-1 on August 31, 2005.264 It hoped to raise $64 million
by selling 8 million units at $8 a share (warrants exercisable at $6 per
share).265 Maxim Group, LLC, a small investment bank that was one of the
pioneers in SPAC offerings, was the underwriter.266 The prospectus

256

Id. at 4.
Id. at 84-85.
258
Id. at 92.
259
HCM Acquisition Co., Form S-1, supra note 186, at 86.
260
See HCM Acquisition Co., Amendment No. 2. to Registration Statement (Form-S-1/A),
at II-2 (Nov. 21, 2007).
261
See HCM Acquisition Co., Amendment No. 5 to Registration Statement (Form-S-1/A),
at i. (May 23, 2008).
262
See Initial Key Offerings Public Offerings Deal Data, EDGAR ONLINE,
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1414123/000095013408010199/0000950134-08-010199index.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2012) (showing that for 2012 "Shareholder Shares Offered," no
dollar figure is offered).
263
See infra Table 4.
264
Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Form S-1, supra note 184, at i.
265
Id.
266
Id. at 58; Investment Banking: Raising Capital Through Innovative Solutions and Global
Distribution Channels, MAXIM GRP. (2012), http://www.maximgrp.com/ investmentbanking/
("Maxim Group is recognized as a leading underwriter of Business Combination Companies
(BCCs), commonly referred to as Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs), with over $2.6
257
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announced a focus on the homeland security and defense industries.267 The
company had eighteen months to consummate an acquisition, unless it
entered into a letter of intent in that period, in which case it would have
another six months to complete an acquisition.268 Initially Alpha Security
intended to be traded OTC,269 but by September 21, 2006 it switched to the
AMEX.270 Although many of the risk factors it presented were similar to
those of other SPAC offerings,271 its filings did identify a special set of risk
factors pertaining to unique risks associated with the homeland security and
defense industries.272 In other words, the registration statement was
somewhat tailored—not wholly a cut-and-paste job. Alpha Security agreed
to pay ASG Management, Inc., an affiliated third party of which the CEO
and executive vice president were principals, $7,500 per month for office
space and administrative services.273 Later amendments changed the size of
the offering to 6 million units at $10 per share.274 On March 6, 2007, the
SPAC revised its conversion threshold from the original 20% (which the
SEC in a comment letter described as the "industry standard") to 35%, thus
making it harder for investors to veto the deal.275
Alpha Security finally went public March 23, 2007.276
The overallotment was not exercised, but the offering generated
$63,200,000: $60 million from the sale of units and $3.2 million from a
private placement of warrants priced at $1.00 per share.277 On June 14,
billion in issuance in 26 transactions, including acting as lead manager in 11 transactions.").
267
Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Form S-1, supra note 184, at 1.
268
Id. at 9.
269
Id. at i ("We intend to apply to have our units quoted on the OTC Bulletin Board . . . .");
see also About the OTC BB (Over the Counter Bulletin Board), OTC STOCK LIST, http://www.otc
stocklist.com/about-the-otcbb/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2012) ("[T]he OTC BB typically trades
securities that are not listed on one of the major US Exchanges (NASDAQ, New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and more . . . .").
270
See Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Amendment No. 2 to Registration Statement (Form-S-1/A),
at i (Sept. 21, 2006).
271
See Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Form S-1, supra note 184, at 9-20 (describing the risks
Alpha brought to investors as a SPAC in general).
272
See id. at 20-24 (describing the risks Alpha brought to investors as a homeland
security/defense SPAC).
273
Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Form S-1, supra note 184, at 2.
274
Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Form S-1/A, supra note 270, at i.
275
Letter from John Reynolds, Assistant Dir. of the SEC, to Steven Wasserman, CEO of
Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., at 2 (Mar. 13, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1329361/
000000000007012986/filename1.pdf. If a percentage between 20% and 35% exercise their
redemption rights, a proportional percentage of the initial stockholders' common stock would be
forfeit. Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 6 (Apr. 15, 2008).
276
See Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Notice of Effectiveness (Form S-1) (Mar. 23, 2007).
277
Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Apr. 3, 2007).
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2007, the stock and warrants began trading separately.278 Alpha Security
board members included the former governor of New Mexico279 and a former
Air Force general.280 The SPAC was late in filing several 10-Qs and its first
10-K, painting a picture of a somewhat unsophisticated company.281 On
September 26, 2008, when the eighteen-month acquisition period was about
to elapse, the company issued a press release stating that it had entered into a
letter of intent and had until March 28, 2009 to complete a business
combination.282
On December 31, 2008, Alpha Security entered into a merger
agreement with Soya China Pte. Ltd. ("Soya"), under which it was to transfer
6,300,000 shares of Alpha Security common stock and an aggregate of
$30,000,000 for the company's outstanding shares.283 Soya appears to be a
food and beverage company;284 it is hard to characterize it as within the

278

Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at Item 8.01 (June 12, 2007).
Capital Markets: Company Overview of Alpha Security Group Corp., BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/person.asp?personId
=24208127&privcapId=23733880&previousCapId=248869&previousTitle=ALLIANT%20TECHS
YSTEMS%20INC.
280
Ronald Fogleman, RIGHT WEB (Feb. 5, 2011), http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/Fogl
eman_Ronald/.
281
See, e.g., Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Notification of Late Filing (Form 12b-25) (May 16,
2008) [hereinafter Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Notification of Late Filing 10-Q] (stating Alpha's reasons
for being late with its 10-Q); Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Notification of Late Filing (Form 12b-25) (Apr.
1, 2008) (describing Alpha's reasons for being late with its 10-K). The excuse on every
Notification of Late Filing for the 10-Qs was the same:
The report of Alpha Security Group Corp. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q
could not be filed within the prescribed time period because the Company's
financial statements could not be completed by its accountants within the
prescribed time period without unreasonable effort or expense. As a result, the
Company could not solicit and obtain the necessary review of the Form 10-Q and
signatures thereto in a timely fashion prior to the due date of the report.
See Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Notification of Late Filing 10-Q, supra note 281. This explanation
seems particularly feeble given the simple nature of the financials, which basically just reported the
interest earned on the trust account and the amounts spent on things like Delaware franchise taxes.
See, e.g., Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., (Form 10-Q), at 2-5 (May 21, 2008) (containing Alpha's financial
statements).
282
PR Newswire, Alpha Security Group Corporation Announces Fulfillment of Condition
for Six Month Extension to Complete a Business Combination, SECURITY INFOWATCH (Sept. 26,
2009), http://www.securityinfowatch.com/news/10545907/alpha-security-group-corporation-anno
unces-fulfillment-of-condition-for-six-month-extension-to-complete-a-business-combination.
283
PR Newswire, Alpha Security Group Corporation to Acquire Soya China Pte. Ltd.,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 6, 2009) [hereinafter PR Newswire, Alpha to Acquire Soya],
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aD2RYFMWmN1o.
284
See News and Intelligence for the Soybean and Oilseed Industries, SOYATECH,
http://www.soyatech.com/index.php (last visited Sept. 18, 2011) ("For more than 20 years,
279
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homeland security or defense industries on which Alpha Security had set out
to focus.285 Soya agreed to certain milestone payments, escrowing a number
of Alpha Security shares that would be released only if certain income
thresholds were met.286 The agreement also contemplated reincorporating as
a Bermudan corporation.287
On March 12, 2009, Alpha Security announced that it would no
longer be pursuing the acquisition of Soya and would proceed with its
liquidation and dissolution.288 On April 6, 2009, AMEX sent Alpha a notice
threatening delisting for failure to file its 10-K on time.289 On May 5, the
company sent out a proxy statement requesting a vote to amend the
certificate of incorporation to allow for the company to continue postdistribution—distribution would still be $10 per share.290 Alpha Security did
not file its next 10-Q.291 On June 15, 2009, Alpha Security sent out a second
proxy proposing dissolution, abandoning its plan of surviving after
distribution.292 It sent out three successive proxies seeking a majority vote
for dissolution, and was de-listed August 29, 2009.293
A review of the beneficial ownership filings (required for holders of
greater than 5% of the company and insiders)294 reveals investments by
Soyatech's products and services for the global soybean and oilseed industry have fostered growth
in food, feed and renewable energy markets.").
285
See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
286
See PR Newswire, Alpha to Acquire Soya, supra note 283.
287
See id.
288
PR Newswire, Alpha Security Group Corporation Terminates Merger Agreement With
Soya China Pte…., Reuters (Mar. 12, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/03/13/id
US19551+13-Mar-2009+PRN20090313.
289
PR Newswire, Alpha Security Group Corporation Notified by NYSE Amex, BLOOMBERG
(Apr. 10, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive &sid=aN6ipAVnbWl8.
290
Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 2 (May 5, 2009) [hereinafter
Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Proxy Statement]. Some language makes it seem as if distribution is
conditioned on approving the proposal. See id. ("To consider and vote on a proposal to permit the
Company to distribute the assets of the Trust Account to the holders of the IPO Shares (the
'Distribution Proposal'). This proposal will be acted upon following, and will be conditioned upon,
the approval of the Certificate of Incorporation Amendment Proposal.").
291
Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (June 1, 2009).
292
Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Schedule 14-A), at 1 (July 29,
2009).
293
See, e.g., Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14-A), at 1 (July
30, 2009) ("[O]ur board of directors has determined it would be in the best interests of our
stockholders to liquidate and dissolve and distribute now to stockholders holding shares of our
common stock . . . in the trust account . . . ."); Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Notification of Removal From
Listing and/or Registration Under Section 12(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 25)
(Aug. 19, 2009).
294
Schedule 13D, SEC, http://sec.gov/answers/sched13.htm (last modified Apr. 4, 2012).
For Alpha, the relevant information is found on its Schedule 13G; see Exchange Act Sections
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individuals,295 investment funds (including entities that appear to specialize
in SPAC investments, e.g., "Fir Tree SPAC Holdings"),296 and Harvard
University's endowment, which made an investment when the acquisition
was announced and sold shortly before Alpha Security was delisted.297
Successful combinations. Services Acquisition Corp. International
("Services") registered its S-1 on February 14, 2005.298 It hoped to raise $40
million by selling 5 million units at $8 per share (warrants exercisable at $6
per share).299 Broadband Capital Management, LLC was the underwriter.300
The prospectus announced that it would seek as a target a service business in
the United States, although it left open the possibility of an international
acquisition.301 The company had eighteen months to consummate an
acquisition, unless it entered into a letter of intent in that period, in which
case it would have a six-month extension.302 Initially Services intended to be
traded OTC,303 but by June 28, 2005 its plans had switched to the AMEX.304
The conversion threshold was set at 20%.305 No executives received a salary,
but Services was to pay two entities—one a corporation owned and managed
by the CEO, the other an "affiliate" of the Vice President and a director—a
total of $7,500 per month for office space and administrative support.306
Sponsors would own 20% of the company if an acquisition were to go
through.307 In connection with the offering, the sponsors bought 1 million
warrants at $1.20 on the open market, agreeing not to sell them until after the
business combination.308

13(d) and 13(g) and Regulation 13D-G Beneficial Ownership Reporting, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/
divisions/corpfin/guidance/reg13d-interp.htm (last modified Nov. 16, 2009) (explaining the subtle
differences between Schedules 13D and 13G).
295
Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., (Schedule 13G) (June 5, 2009) (naming Bulldog Investors,
Phillip Goldstein, and Andrew Dakos as investors).
296
See Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Amendment No. 3 to Schedule 13G, (SC13G/A), at 5 (Feb.
16, 2010).
297
See Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Amendment No. 1 to Schedule 13G, (SC13G/A), at 2-5
(Sept. 8, 2009).
298
Servs. Acquisition Corp. Int'l, Registration Statement (Form S-1), at i (Feb. 14, 2005).
299
Id. at 2.
300
Id. at 43.
301
Id. at 1.
302
Servs. Acquisition Corp. Int'l, Form S-1, supra note 298, at 4.
303
Id. at i.
304
Servs. Acquisition Corp. Int'l, Amendment No. 4 to Registration Statement (Form S-1/A),
at i (June 28, 2005).
305
Servs. Acquisition Corp. Int'l, Form S-1, supra note 298, at 5.
306
Id. at 33.
307
Id. at 17.
308
Id. at 37.
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Services went public on July 6, 2005.309 The underwriters exercised
the overallotment option.310 The warrants separated from the common stock
on July 28, 2005.311 It timely filed 10-Qs312 and its annual report.313 On
March 10, 2006, the company announced an agreement with Jamba Juice
Company, a maker of juices and smoothies, for $265 million.314 If the
business combination were to go through, the warrant holders would be able
to exercise their warrants and pay $6 for stock trading at $10.55, thus
creating substantial dilution for Jamba Juice.315 Services also conducted a
private placement financing on March 10 and March 15, 2006, which
included as investors certain current Jamba Juice stockholders and board
members.316 It appears that the private placement not only raised $231.6
million to be used as merger consideration, but also allowed Jamba Juice
insiders to avoid at least some dilution from the warrants.317 On November
28, 2006, Services' shareholders approved the acquisition.318 The company
"up-listed" to the NASDAQ319 and its common stock began trading under
the symbol JMBA, under which it still trades today.320

309

Servs. Acquisition Corp. Int'l, Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (July 6, 2005).
Servs. Acquisition Corp. Int'l, Amendment No. 1 to Current Report (Form 8-K/A), at 2
(July 7, 2005).
311
Servs. Acquisition Corp. Int'l, Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (July 25, 2005).
312
See generally Servs. Acquisition Corp. Int'l, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) at F-1 to F-4
(Aug. 15, 2005) (containing Services' financial statements).
313
See Servs. Acquisition Corp. Int'l, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2 (Mar. 29, 2006)
("This 10-K was prepared and relates to the Company as of December 31, 2005.").
314
Servs. Acquisition Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at Ex. 99.1 (Mar. 13, 2006).
315
See Servs. Acquisition Corp. Int'l, Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2-3 (Mar. 16, 2006);
Servs. Acquisition Corp. Int'l, Preliminary Proxy Statement (Schedule 14-A), at 34 (Mar. 29, 2006)
("Each warrant expires on June 28, 2009, or earlier upon redemption, and entitles the holder to
purchase one share of our common stock at an exercise price of $6.00 per share.").
316
Servs. Acquisition Corp. Int'l, Current Report (Mar. 16, 2006), supra note 315, at 4.
317
See id.; Servs. Acquisition Corp. Int'l, Schedule 14-A, supra note 316, at 34.
Presumably, with this $231.6 million, any dilution problems could be at least partially remedied.
See Servs. Acquisition Corp. Int'l, Form 8-K, supra note 315, at 4; Servs. Acquisition Corp. Int'l,
Schedule 14-A, supra note 315, at 34.
318
Services Acquisition Corp (SVI) Says Shareholders Approve Merger with Jamba Juice,
STREETINSIDER.COM, (Nov. 28, 2006), http://www.streetinsider.com/Mergers+and+Acquisitions/
Services+Acquisition+Corp+(SVI)+Says+Shareholders+Approve+Merger+with+Jamba+Juice/1384
982.html (announcing the shareholder approval of the merger and stating the transaction was
expected to close the following day on November 29, 2006).
319
Letter from Gary Sundick, Vice President of Listings/Investigations to Brian K. Johnson,
Office of Filings Information Services, SEC (Nov. 29, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/vprr/06/9999999997-06-047263.
320
See Investor Relations, JAMBA JUICE, http://ir.jambajuice.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=
192409&p=irol-irhome (last visited Aug. 22, 2012).
310
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V. OVERVIEW OF SPAC DATA
Having surveyed the potential fates SPACs may experience, we turn
to our empirical data. Our sample of SPACs consists of 243 firms that filed
a preliminary prospectus with the SEC as a blank check company from 2003
to 2008. We also include some preliminary analysis of the SPAC activity
from 2009 to December 2011, which consists of 30 filings.321 We put
together the main sample by using Morningstar Document Research322 to
search all S-1 filings on EDGAR323 from January 1, 2003 to December 31,
2008 for the term "6770," which is the Standard Industrial Classification
("SIC") designation for blank check companies.324 We could not rely on the
SIC category itself because the SEC may reclassify successful SPACs with
the target's SIC code number.325 For example, a SPAC may originally file
under the blank check 6770 category. Upon acquiring a company that makes
and sells cookies, it would be assigned the code 2052 (the "cookies and
crackers" category).326 A current search of 6770 SIC codes thus would not
reveal this SPAC. But a word search for the term "6770" in its original S-1
filing does.
After deleting duplicate observations and S-1s for secondary equity
offerings, we were left with a sample of 297 possible SPACs. Of these
filings, fifty-four transactions had one or more characteristics that caused us
to eliminate them from our sample. In particular:
•

Twenty-nine potential SPACs did not have 6770 as their SIC
code in their preliminary S-1.327

•

Nine were subject to Rule 419, and thus by definition not a
SPAC.328

321
See infra Table 4. We do not include these firms in the main analysis since their period
to find an acquisition has not yet expired.
322
Morningstar Document Research is a database that "streamlines public company
research" Morningstar Document Research, MORNINGSTAR (2012), http://www.10kwizard.com/.
323
EDGAR is the SEC's online filing system. See Filings and Forms, U.S. SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (last modified Feb. 21, 2012).
324
Division of Corporation Finance: Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code List
[hereinafter SIC Code List], U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/siccodes.htm (last modified Oct. 26, 2011).
325
See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
326
SIC Code List, supra note 324.
327
For example, the word search for "6770" in S-1s may net a firm with the address of
"6770 Main Street."
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•

Four were not unit offerings, which is a standard characteristic of
SPACs.329

•

Seven firms were limited partnership commodity pools, which are
atypical of the classic SPAC.330

•

Three firms filed under small business guidelines.331

•

One proposed offering was under $10 million and proposed to
trade in only a few states.332

These screens left us with a sample of 243 SPACs from 2003 to 2008
as to which we were able to learn about the entire life of the entity. We
provide some analysis of thirty additional SPACs that filed an S-1 from 2009
to December 2011. For example, 57th Street Acquisition Corp. filed an S-1
in 2009,333 and completed an acquisition in May of 2011.334
We used the Securities Data Company ("SDC") M&A database,335
EDGAR filings, and LexisNexis news announcements336 to collect the
specific data related to the proposed IPO, the IPO, and any business
combination. We found that there is no standard way to collect SPAC data
from SDC, through either its IPO database or its M&A data. The main
reason is that SDC does not uniformly classify SPACs by a particular
industry or even by the SIC code listed in the S-1. Thus, we used SDC only
as a supplemental source of SPAC life-cycle data. All business combination
announcement dates were collected through LexisNexis and EDGAR filings.
328

See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
330
See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
331
Firms going public as "small businesses" or, after February 4, 2008, as "smaller
reporting companies," are subject to less stringent disclosure requirements. See Changeover to the
SEC’s New Smaller Reporting Company System by Small Business Issuers and Non-Accelerated
Filer Companies: A Small Entity Compliance Guide, available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/
secg/smrepcosysguid.pdf. We exclude these filers for the sake of consistency across the sample.
332
Contrast this with the amounts usually invested in a SPAC, and their hallmark of free
tradability. See, e.g., supra note 232 and accompanying text (describing how SPAC offerings are
usually well over $5,000,000) and supra note 230 and accompanying text (stating that SPAC
offerings can trade as soon as the vehicle goes public).
333
57th St. Gen. Acquisition Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Nov. 16, 2009).
334
See 57th St. Gen. Acquisition Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 6, 2011).
335
SDC Platinum – Securities Data Company, HARVARD BUS. SCH. BLOOMBERG CTR.,
http://www.library.hbs.edu/go/sdcplatinum.html.
336
Information Professional, LEXISNEXIS, http://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/other-businesssolutions/news-and-business-research.page.
329
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We also conducted several interviews with SPAC participants—sponsors,
investment bankers, and lawyers—in order to further our understanding of
these transactions.
In Table 1, we provide an overview of the most notable SPAC
characteristics for the purposes of this Article: the months allowed for
combination, the conversion threshold, and the percentage of contributed
funds held in trust. "Months allowed for combination" corresponds to the
limited life of the SPAC. The shelf life of all SPACs is much shorter than
the 10-year standard for traditional private equity.337 As seen in Table 1
below, the longest lived SPAC observed had thirty-six months to
complete an acquisition, and the shortest-lived SPAC observed had a mere
eighteen months.
TABLE 1. STATISTICS FOR 243 SPACS THAT FILED
AN S-1 FROM 2003 TO 2008
Months allowed for combination
Conversion threshold
% held in trust

Mean
25.5
27.2%
96.3%

Median
24.0
30.0%
98.0%

Maximum
36.0
40.0%
110.1%

Minimum
18.0
20.0%
82.8%

The "conversion threshold" in Table 1 is a measure of the power of
SPAC investors to veto a specific combination proposed by managers.338 If
more than the given threshold votes to reject the deal and receive their share
of the trust account back, then the acquisition will not occur.339 The
conversion threshold thus functions as a supermajority approval requirement,
and is a key investor protection present in SPACs and absent in traditional
private equity.340 Table 1 demonstrates that for this sample, which ends in
2008, the minimum conversion threshold is 20% and the maximum is 40%.

337
Compare Riemer, supra note 45, at 946 n.98 ("While a two-year limit was (and remains)
typical, because SPACs are not bound by a statutory time limit, management may institute a longer
or shorter limit at its discretion. Second-generation SPACs generally require that a letter of intent to
conduct a business combination be filed within eighteen months of the IPO and that the
combination be completed within twenty-four months."), with supra notes 101, 134 and
accompanying text (explaining the average ten-year lifespan of a private equity investment).
338
See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
339
See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
340
Compare supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (explaining a SPAC's "conversion
threshold"), with supra notes 88, 137 and accompanying text (explaining the limited voice investors
have in traditional private equity investments).
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As Part VII of this Article will detail, we have preliminary data on more
recent, so-called "Third Generation" SPACs, which employ a much higher
conversion threshold, effectively eliminating investor voice.
Finally, the "% held in trust" in Table 1 refers to the amount of the
IPO proceeds that are held in an escrowed trust account, and may not be
released until the conclusion of the acquisition. It is the placement of funds
in trust that provides investors with the assurance that they can receive most
of their money back if the SPAC sponsors fail to find or complete a deal, or
if the investor wishes to opt out of it.341 Table 1 shows that the range of the
amount held in trust is 82.8% to 110%.342
Figure 2 below shows the outcomes of SPACs over time. As seen by
the thick dark line, the two largest peaks in SPAC S-1 filings occurred in
2005 and in the latter half of 2007 and the first half of 2008. Notably, the
success rate of the SPAC formed in these two different periods is highly
dissimilar. As seen in Figure 2, at the 2005 peak SPACs that completed
both an IPO and an acquisition comprised the highest number of
transactions, followed second by transactions that completed an IPO but not
an acquisition, and trailed by transactions that did not complete an IPO. In
contrast, in the 2007/2008 peak the greatest number of transactions, by far,
involved SPACs with withdrawn S-1s. As demonstrated in Figure 2, some
SPACs successfully acquired targets in 2007, but starting at the beginning of
2008, every proposed SPAC IPO was withdrawn. However, the graph does
reveal the more recent resurgence in SPAC activity to levels similar to late
2003 and 2004.

341

See, e.g., supra notes 174, 177, 180-82 and accompanying text (explaining the classic
protection features of a SPAC).
342
"% held in trust" is the amount actually held in the trust account divided by the total
amount raised in the IPO. So if the amount paid by the sponsors for private placement shares or
warrants exceeds the amount spent on offering costs and other miscellany, the number can exceed
100%.
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VI. SHARED CONTRACTUAL STRATEGIES
This Part focuses on the investor protection strategies that SPACs
borrow from traditional private equity. These strategies highlight the basic
structural similarities between SPACs and their private equity cousins, and
will ultimately allow us to appreciate the magnitude of SPACs' departures
from the traditional private equity template in the areas of voice and exit.
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A. Managerial Compensation: A Story of Convergence
1. The Magic 20
Venture capital managers receive 20% of any realized gains from the
sale or IPO of portfolio companies, known as carried interest.343 More than
50% of venture capital firms also charge an annual 2.5% management fee.344
Although venture capital fund managers make a modest salary and bonus,
the carried interest makes up the lion's share of their compensation.345
Buyout fund managers follow a similar pattern, with managers receiving
20% of the profit.346 They also charge investors a management fee of around
2%.347 In addition, buyout funds also charge their portfolio companies
management fees.348
The literature emphasizes the important role this compensation
structure plays in constraining agency costs.349 In the venture capital context,
Professor Ron J. Gilson calls it "the front line response to the potential for
agency costs resulting from allocating to the GP the control necessary to
apply its skill and expertise on behalf of the investors."350 In buyout funds,
Professor Victor Fleischer observes:
The carried interest thus provides the most powerful incentive
to work hard. A large carry is one of the hallmarks of a private
equity fund, and is considered essential to attracting talented
managers. While private equity managers could live well on
their base salaries alone, they would not be truly rich. Only the
compensation of the carried interest of a successful fund can do

343

See Fleischer, supra note 38, at 8.
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
345
See Sahlman, supra note 9, at 495 ("[T]he carried interest component of compensation
is large in relation to other components."); see also Gompers & Lerner, Analysis of Compensation,
supra note 9, at 6 (conducting an empirical study that found management fees of 1.5% to 3% and a
large concentration of carry at 20%).
346
See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
347
See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
348
See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 73, at 124.
349
See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 88, at 1089 (stating that venture fund compensation is the
way for investors to keep management in line); Fleischer, supra note 100, at 97 (explaining that
private equity managers can earn a salary anywhere, and that the funds' potential profits are what
keep them committed).
350
Gilson, supra note 88, at 1089.
344
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that, and it is the prodigious carry of successful private equity
funds that lures professionals away from investment banks,
commercial banks, and other investment management
companies.351
As originally conceived, SPAC sponsors, like traditional private
equity managers, received around 20% of the venture's profits.352 This
result was achieved by permitting those sponsors to buy a significant
percentage of the SPAC shares, almost uniformly 20%, at a nominal
amount.353 In 211 of the 260 companies observed in Figure 3 below,
sponsors received exactly 20% of the company in the form of pre-IPO share
sales. As can be seen in the chart, 224 firms' sponsors received between
20.0% and 20.9%. Eleven firms received 16-19.9%, and another 8 firms
received 21%-24.9%. These sponsor shares were placed in escrow, and
released only upon the completion of the acquisition.354 Thus, if the SPAC
failed to find a suitable target or to gain approval of a proposed acquisition,
sponsors did not receive a share of the trust account upon liquidation.355 In
addition, these shares had generally to be voted with the majority of shares
held by public shareholders—in other words, the SPAC sponsors had to vote
their stock in accordance with the public shareholders' wishes.356 While it is
hard to see how SPACs could be structured without this sponsor share
escrow (because without the escrow the sponsors would immediately claim a
sizeable share of the funds raised in the initial public offering), the
escrowing of sponsor shares strongly motivates the sponsors to pursue a
business combination at all costs.357 Liquidation means that the sponsors

351

Fleischer, supra note 100, at 97.
See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
353
See, e.g., supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text (explaining how the system of
SPAC sponsors buying shares in themselves works); see also Bank St. Telecom Funding Corp.,
Form S-1, supra note 185, at 16 (stating that post-acquisition, the sponsors will "collectively own
approximately 20% of [the] issued and outstanding shares of common stock . . . .").
354
See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
355
See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
356
See, e.g. Michael A. Pittinger & Cara M. Grisin, When SPACs Attack: The Role of
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies in the M&A Market, 12 DEAL POINTS: THE NEWSLETTER
OF THE COMM. ON NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS, Fall 2007, at 4 n. 14 available at
http://potteranderson.com/uploads/90/doc/Deal%20Points%20-%20Fall%202007%20issue%20SPA
C%20article.pdf ("To ensure that any applicable stockholder vote requirements of the jurisdiction of
organization are also satisfied, the founders typically agree to vote in favor of the proposed business
combination or to vote their shares in accordance with the vote of the IPO shares.").
357
See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text; see also Roger Ehrenberg, Does SPAC
Spell Scam?, SEEKING ALPHA (May 18, 2008), http://seekingalpha.com/article/77687-does-spac352
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receive nothing; indeed, if a private placement occurred, the sponsors would
be out of pocket for the SPAC expenses.358
Figure 3.

Strikingly, the managers of each type of fund expect to make the bulk
of their money from their claim to 20% of the profits of the venture.359
Below the surface, however, venture and private equity funds' managerial
compensation have much more in common with each other than with
SPACs. While they expect to reap most profits from carried interest (which,
controversially, is taxed at the preferential capital gains rate),360 they also
claim salaries and management fees.361 SPAC managers, in contrast, receive
nothing unless and until a deal is consummated.362
However, SPAC sponsors receive their 20%—or at least, their shares
are released from escrow and are thus liquid—upon acquisition.363 In
spell-scam ("SPAC sponsors . . . are all about getting the deal done, since the clock is always ticking
on deploying their funds before they have to be returned to investors.").
358
See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text; see also Bonenfant, supra note 194
("[F]ounders contribute nominal capital for 100% of the SPAC capital stock. After the initial
capitalization, the founders and other sophisticated investors participate in a private placement to
purchase SPAC securities. The proceeds of the private placement provide working capital to carry
the SPAC through its IPO, and fund operating expenses until an acquisition is consummated.").
359
See supra notes 108, 142, 179-86 and accompanying text.
360
See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
361
See supra notes 108, 142 and accompanying text.
362
See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
363
See supra notes 179-82. However, the sponsors' shares are subject to lock-ups. See
supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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contrast, VC and private equity managers receive money, not upon
investment of the fund's assets in the portfolio company, but rather upon
realization of profit (i.e. upon sale or IPO of that company).364 So while of
course managers of all three entities are motivated to pursue acquisitions,
only SPAC sponsors are rewarded for the mere fact of acquisition.365 Indeed,
a common risk factor in SPAC prospectuses warns investors:
[T]he [officers' and directors'] shares acquired prior to this
offering, as well as the sponsors' warrants and any warrants
purchased by our officers or directors in the aftermarket, will
be worthless if we do not consummate our initial business
combination. The personal and financial interests of our
directors and officers may influence their motivation in timely
identifying and selecting a target business and completing a
business combination. Consequently, our directors' and
officers' discretion in identifying and selecting a suitable target
business may result in a conflict of interest when determining
whether the terms, conditions and timing of a particular
business combination are appropriate and in our stockholders'
best interest.366
Interestingly, modern SPACs have reduced or delayed the sponsor's
ability to realize all of the "Magic 20" upon acquisition.367 For example, a
recent SPAC provided that transfer restrictions limiting the ability of the
sponsors to sell shares would lapse as certain milestones were reached: 20%
upon acquisition, 20% after the closing price of the stock was over $12.00,
and additional 20% increments when it reached $13.50, $15.00, and
$17.00.368 This conditioning of compensation on profit, rather than on

364

See Gilson, supra note 88, at 1089. Clawbacks delay the GP's payout, or hold it back,
until total performance is known. Id.
365
See Ehrenberg, supra note 357.
366
Hyde Park Acquisition Corp. II, Amendment No. 1 to Registration Statement (Form S1/A), at 31 (June 10, 2011).
367
Stuart Neuhauser, Assessing the Resurgence of SPACs in the 2011 IPO Market, IPO
VITAL SIGNS (June 17, 2011), http://www.ipovitalsigns.com/PressReleases/6_20_11_Article.htm
("In addition, Generation III SPACs have either reduced the sponsor's ownership in the vehicle or
provided for tranching/forfeiture of such interests based upon stock appreciation of the SPAC post
business combination.").
368
Empeiria Acquisition Corp., Amendment No. 4 to Registration Statement (Form S-1/A),
at 6 (May 24, 2011).
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investment, makes recent SPACs look even more like their private equity
cousins.
2. "Skin in the Game"
The incentives of the SPAC sponsor are of critical importance.
Initially sponsors put up little of their own money, but now they often
purchase additional shares or warrants through a private placement369 around
the time of the offering, in the offering itself, or in the secondary market.370
These purchases supplement the amount the sponsors have put at risk in the
SPAC and increase their "skin in the game."371
Private placements also allow the SPAC to promise investors that
close to 100% of the proceeds will remain in trust, as the private placement
funds, rather than the offering proceeds, are used to pay the SPAC's
operating expenses.372 Sometimes these later-acquired sponsor shares carry
with them no voting restrictions and allow for participation without
restriction in any liquidation event.373 In other cases, private placements are
subject to escrow and other restrictions.374 As seen in Table 2 below, the
average (median) amount invested by the managers of the firms observed in
a private placement was $3.3 ($2.5) million. This amount represents about
2.5% of the total amount of proposed proceeds. In addition, there were fiftyfive SPACs, most of which were formed before 2006, for which there was
no private placement at all.

369

In a private placement, securities are sold to a small number of investors to raise capital
without a public offering. Private Placement, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/
glossary/p/private-placement.
370
See Ellenoff Grossman & Schole LLP, "SPAC" Special Purpose
Acquisition Corporation, www.egsllp.com/SPACPPP.ppt (characterizing "[c]oncurrent [p]rivate
[p]lacement/[s]ponsor [l]oans" as a "historical trend").
371
See id.; Telephone Interview with Doug Ellenoff, Member of Ellenoff Grossman &
Schole LLP (Mar. 4, 2011); see also Riemer, supra note 45, at 959 (describing how traditional
money invested by SPAC sponsors constitutes "skin in the game").
372
See Bonenfant, supra note 194.
373
See Neuhauser, supra note 367 (stating that one of the objectives of newly developed
SPACs is to "align[] the equity interests of the sponsor with investors and target businesses").
374
See, e.g., Catalytic Capital Inv. Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 2 (Mar. 24,
2006).
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TABLE 2. STATISTICS FOR 270 PROPOSED SPACS THAT
FILED AN S-1 FROM 2003 TO 2011
Mean

Median

$141.1

$100.0

$900.0

$12.5

$3.3

$2.5

$35.0

$0.0

-2003 to 2005 (83 observations)

$0.8

$0.0

$11.3

$0.0

-2006 to 2011 (177 observations)

$4.6

$3.8

$35.0

$0.0

2.5%

2.5%

9.7%

0.0%

-2003 to 2005 (83 observations)

1.2%

0.0%

9.1%

0.0%

-2006 to 2011 (177 observations)

3.1%

2.9%

9.7%

0.0%

Proposed IPO Proceeds ($mil)
Private Placement ($mil)

Private Placement / Prop. IPO
Proceeds

Maximum

Minimum

Indeed, as the SPAC form evolved, sponsors were expected to put
more and more of their own money at risk (in the form of private
placements), setting themselves up for substantial losses if no acquisition
occurred.375 In the interviews we conducted, we heard two explanations for
the marked increase in private placements. The first is the "skin in the
game" explanation: in the early years, successful SPAC sponsors received
20% of companies without risking much, and the consensus was that the
market demanded more of a show of commitment from the managers.376 The
second explanation discounted the "skin in the game" theory, suggesting
instead that the market's true concern was with pursuing shareholder
protection through ever-larger escrow accounts.377 The SPAC model is easily

375

See Barker & Hedin, supra note 43, at 38 ("More recent deals are placing between 95100% in trust (net of underwriters' compensation and expenses but not of other offering expenses).
SPACs that place 100% into the trust account raise the necessary funds for their offering expenses
and other expenses incurred in connection with identifying and evaluating a target business
through private placements to, and borrowings from, the founding stockholders or sponsors.")
(footnote omitted).
376
See Telephone Interview with Doug Ellenoff, supra note 371.
377
See id.
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mimicked; the largely generic filings are publicly available,378 and the
company itself is merely an empty shell.379 The primary way for a SPAC to
distinguish itself from the rapidly multiplying number of competitors was to
offer investors more of their money back if no acquisition occurred or if they
exercised their opt-out rights.380 This explanation correlates with the trend
we discuss in Part VII, pursuant to which the SPAC trusts retained everhigher percentages of the public offering proceeds.381 Increasing amounts
held in trust decreased the amount of offering proceeds available to run the
SPAC.382 Operating money had to come from somewhere else, and the
SPACs' sponsors were the obvious choice.383
Whatever the reason, SPAC sponsors now commit their own money to
the fund, an average of 2.5% of the IPO proceeds.384 While a comparison to
traditional private equity would be revealing, we have found little hard data
on the amount that buyout and venture GPs invest in their own funds.
Estimates range from 1%-5% of the capital of the fund.385 The authors of
one treatise recommend, as a minimum general partner investment, the lesser
of 0.2% of total capital commitments and $500,000.386 This may, however,
be only a minimum.387 For "marketing purposes"—to ensure an alignment of
interests with investors—managers may be expected to contribute more
capital to the fund.388 One source reports that the mean contribution by

378

See supra note 323 for an explanation of EDGAR, the SEC's electronic filing system.
See supra notes 172, 175-76 and accompanying text.
380
See Wittlin & Ferris, supra note 241, at 2 (explaining the traditional SPAC structure).
381
See M. Ridgway Barker & Michael L. Pflaum, Exchanges for Listing SPACs – A Shifting
Landscape, THE METRO. CORP. COUNSEL 5, 5 (Jan. 2009), available at http://www.metrocorpco
unsel.com/pdf/2009/January/05.pdf (stating that pursuant to new NYSE and NASDAQ rules, at
least 90% of what is earned in the IPO must go into the trust account).
382
See Barker & Hedin, supra note 43, at 38.
383
See id.
384
See supra Table 2.
385
Fleischer, supra note 38, at 8; see also Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating
Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 183, 229 (2009) ("[I]t is common for investors in
hedge funds or private equity partnerships to insist that the managers themselves place a
meaningful percentage of their own net worth at risk alongside the investors' money.").
386
STEPHANIE BRESLOW & PHYLLIS SCHWARTZ, PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS: FORMATION
AND OPERATION § 2:5.3, at 2-28 (Practicing Law Inst., 1st ed. 2009). Tax reasons partly explain
the requirement of GP investment. Id.; see also Fleischer, supra note 100, at 82 ("The GP also
contributes about 1% of the capital to the fund. This amount, which is largely an artifact of tax
history, is small in comparison to the carry and generally has a negligible effect on incentives.")
(footnote omitted).
387
BRESLOW, supra note 386, § 2:5.3[B], at 2-29.
388
Id.
379
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general partners was 3.25% for buyout funds and 2.1% for venture capital
funds.389
Much remains unclear about the extent and reasons for managers'
investment in the funds they oversee. What is clear is that the norm in
traditional private equity is for managers to have some stake in the firm.390
SPACs initially deviated from this pattern, but quickly conformed to it.391
As Part VIII of this Article discusses, some commentators view managerial
investment in traditional private equity as a mere "artifact of tax history."392
But evidence that SPAC founders experienced evolutionary pressure to put
up their own money, coupled with the move to condition the distribution of
escrowed shares to the founders on performance goals, suggests that "skin in
the game" might actually be significant in traditional private equity as well.393
B. Time Limit
SPACs share with venture capital and private-equity firms the
characteristic of a built-in fund life.394 Venture funds are usually ten years in
length, although they can be extended for up to three years, usually in oneyear increments.395 Private equity funds follow this pattern.396 "[P]artners are
automatically cashed out of the fund on expiration of the fund's limited
term . . . ."397 Sahlman calls the limited life of a VC fund "the ultimate tool
for aligning the interests of the agent and principal . . . ."398 "[T]he venture
capitalist cannot keep the money forever," and knows he will be called to
account at a certain date.399

389
Robert C. Illig, Hedge Funds: The Missing Link in Executive Pay Reform, 28 BANKING
& FIN. SERVS. POL'Y REP. 10, 11 n.7 (2009) (citations omitted).
390
See supra notes 385-89 and accompanying text.
391
See supra note 370 and accompanying text.
392
See Fleischer, supra note 100, at 82.
393
See supra BRESLOW, supra note 386, § 2:5.3[B] ("[I]t is typically viewed as
acceptable and even as desirable that a portion of the sponsor commitments come from other
employees who will be actively involved in managing the funds.") (emphasis added).
394
See supra note 337 and accompanying text.
395
Sahlman, supra note 9, at 490.
396
See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 73, at 123.
397
Ribstein, supra note 150, at 299.
398
Sahlman, supra note 9, at 501.
399
See id. at 494, 501 ("The possibility that the interests of general and limited partners will
diverge over time is addressed directly by limiting the lifespan on the venture-capital partnership.
The ability to withdraw funding support is the ultimate tool for aligning the interests of the agent
and principal in this organizational form, and is reinforced by the existence of the scale or scope
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While SPACs also employ a fixed life, their life span is much shorter
than that of the ten-year private equity fund.400 Typically SPACs have an
initial time limit, originally eighteen months—exactly paralleling the
requirements of Rule 419.401 As with venture capital and private equity
funds, SPAC structures sometimes allow for an extension of the original
time period (usually by six months) if a letter of intent with a target company
is signed.402 Counting the extension period, most SPACs impose a limit of
two years on completing an acquisition.403
The variation in SPAC shelf life, as seen in Table 3 below, is striking.
When the NYSE and NASDAQ began listing SPACs in 2008, they
permitted a maximum of thirty-six months for a combination, which is the
maximum we observed in our sample.404 The minimum time permitted we
observed is eighteen months, and the average allowed for a preliminary
acquisition agreement to be reached was twenty-five months.405 For our
sample's thirty Third Generation SPACs (those SPACs with an initial S-1
filed from 2009-2011) the range is from fifteen to twenty-three months to
complete an acquisition.406 It thus appears that, unlike in the venture capital
and private-equity context, no industry norm has emerged for SPAC
duration.407
We posit that this lack of uniformity may be because the time limit
constraint necessarily functions differently in the SPAC, where ownership is
liquid, than in the private venture or buyout fund. For traditional investment
funds, a fund's expiration date functions both to discipline managers and to
provide liquidity to investors.408 SPACs separate these functions. Public
trading of SPAC shares guarantees a measure of liquidity.409 SPACs
economies and learning-curve effects.").
400
See supra note 337 and accompanying text.
401
See Derek K. Heyman, From Blank Check to SPAC: The Regulator's Response to the
Market, and the Market's Response to the Regulation, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 531, 542
(2007) (explaining the timing similarities between Rule 419 and a typical SPAC).
402
See, e.g., Riemer, supra note 45, at 946 n.98 (explaining the normal time constraints on
a SPAC).
403
See, e.g., id.
404
Client Alert: Nasdaq Joins NYSE and AMEX in Allowing Listing of Special Purpose
Acquisition Companies (SPACs), Chadbourne & Parke LLP, (Aug. 20, 2008), http://www.chadbo
urne.com/clientalerts/2008/specialacquisition/.
405
See infra Table 4.
406
See infra Table 4.
407
See supra notes 101, 134 and accompanying text.
408
See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 73, at 123 (explaining how and why management
divides up the ten year period in LBOs).
409
See Heyman, supra note 401, at 543 (stating that SPACs now being listed on exchanges
"increases their liquidity and access to capital . . . .").
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generally trade at a slight premium to their share of the trust account,
reflecting the option value that SPACs provide regarding future
acquisitions.410
However, the SPAC model does require some kind of expiration
411
date. The time constraints associated with SPACs limit the amount of time
managers have the trust account at their disposal.412 Without them, investors
might worry that managers will simply sit on the money indefinitely; a
limited lifespan thus increases the value of the trust fund to investors.413
C. Concentration Limits
Traditional private equity funds place limits on the amount that may
be committed to any one acquisition, i.e., on the amount that can be invested
in a single company.414 This contractual constraint prevents a fund from
being overexposed to any one company.415 What investors look for from
these funds is a portfolio—a bench or lineup of companies.416 It is
understood that some companies will underperform, but ideally there will be
one or two "home runs" that generate outsized returns that help produce the
overall 20%-30%417 return for which managers of these entities aim. Some
may even specify certain percentages of asset classes the fund must hold.418

410

See Barker & Hedin, supra note 41, at 6 (stating that "the SPAC's common stock
trades at a substantial premium . . . .").
411
See supra note 404 and accompanying text.
412
See Riemer, supra note 45, at 946 n.98 (citations omitted).
413
See id. (describing the timeline of SPACs).
414
Sahlman, supra note 9, at 496-99; Gompers & Lerner, The Use of Covenants, supra note
160, at 480.
415
See Gompers & Lerner, The Use of Covenants, supra note 160, at 480 ("These
provisions are intended to ensure that the general partners do not attempt to salvage an investment
in a poorly performing firm by investing significant resources in follow-on funding.").
416
See supra notes 102-03 (explaining "portfolio companies").
417
See Edward Wolkowitz et al., Debtor-in-Possession Financing in Mega-Cases:
Transcript of Proceedings, 39 SW. U. L. REV. 643, 669 (2010); see also Sandra Bosela, Valuation –
Spreadsheet or Napkin?, 2005 J. BUS. VALUATION 229, 232 (2005) ("Historically, 25 to 30 percent
was a common hurdle or target IRR for private equity investors.").
418
Gompers & Lerner, The Use of Covenants, supra note 160, at 483.
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TABLE 3. STATISTICS FOR 86 SPACS THAT COMPLETED
AN ACQUISITION
Mean

Median

Max.

Min.

IPO proceeds ($mil)

$124.0

$60.0

$900.0

$15.8

Value of combination ($mil)

$254.0

$128.4

$3,403.4

$13.0

Value of comb. / IPO proceeds

252.4%

181.1% 1,3507.7% 13.0%

SPACs, in contrast, are one-shot deals. In a traditional SPAC, any
business combination must have a fair market value of at least 80% of the
trust value.419 This provision restricts the sponsors from being able to access
the trust account for anything less than a substantial business combination
(and also mirrors a Rule 419 requirement).420 In Table 3 above, we show
statistics on eighty-six of the eighty-seven transactions observed in which the
SPAC was able to successfully acquire a target. As can be seen, the average
amount paid for the acquisition is $254 million and the range of acquisition
size is vast, especially in comparison to the range of IPO proceeds, from a
minimum of $13.0 million to a maximum of $3.4 billion. Furthermore, the
average value of the acquisition, scaled by the value of the IPO proceeds of
252%, exceeds the bar of 80% significantly.421 However, Table 3 does show
that about 10% of the acquisitions do not exceed the 80% hurdle. This is
primarily for two reasons. First, we measured only the initial acquisition
made. Second, our sample contained instances of SPACs renegotiating the
SPAC's terms with shareholders, which we found lead to a partial
liquidation of funds and thus a lower proceeds amount.
Although restrictions on the amount that may be committed in SPACs
are the polar opposite to those in traditional private equity (i.e., SPACs
require commitment to one transaction, whereas venture and buyout funds
require multiple investments), the restrictions are cut from the same cloth.422

419
420

as well).

421

See, e.g., Davidoff, supra note 4, at 225.
See, e.g., Riemer, supra note 45, at 942 (stating that Rule 419 maintained an 80% rule

See supra note 420 and accompanying text.
Davidoff, supra note 4, at 238 ("A SPAC has similar suboptimal risk-bearing
characteristics vis-à-vis the private equity fund investment for which it ostensibly substitutes. A
purchase of SPAC securities is typically an investment in a single, to-be-determined acquisition.")
(footnote omitted).
422
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In each case, the contractual limitation helps ensure that the managers honor
the governing principle of the investment.423 In the case of traditional private
equity, the goal is investment in multiple private companies.424 In the case of
SPACs, it is investment in a single company.425 Each form places
contractual limits on investment amounts in order to achieve its specified
end.426
D. Reporting of Information
As private firms offering only to accredited investors, venture and
private equity funds are exempt from the mandatory disclosure
requirements of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.427 Buyout and VC
investors nonetheless usually have contractual rights to receive periodic
reports from their managers, in the form of fund-level financial
statements.428 Venture investors have annual meetings with the GPs and
sometimes with the management of key portfolio companies.429 They may
receive written information on portfolio companies as well, at the discretion
of the GP.430
As holders of publicly traded securities, SPAC investors receive
the periodic reports required by the 1934 Act: annual reports, quarterly
reports, proxy statements, and 8-Ks whenever material changes in the
company occur.431 However, this level of transparency is not as great as first
impressions may suggest. SPACs' public filings are generally boilerplate;
indeed, a main attraction of the form is that, because the company is a
"shell," there is little of substance to disclose in the initial prospectus.432
Once a firm is public, its quarterly and annual reports do little more than

423

See id. at 225.
Id. at 189.
425
Id. at 225.
426
See Davidoff, supra note 4, at 225.
427
Spindler, supra note 133, at 311.
428
See id. at 327-28 (explaining the usual types of information private investors receive).
429
Sahlman, supra note 9, at 492.
430
See Spindler, supra note 133, at 327.
431
See Riemer, supra note 45, at 963 ("SPACs must issue all reports and disclosures
required of public companies, and they must also comply with the disclosure requirements of the
exchanges on which they trade."); see also Bonenfant, supra note 194 (listing the SEC rules that
SPACs must follow).
432
See SEC Restricts SPAC Managers' Warrant Purchases, THE REVERSE MERGER
REPORT, 14-15 (2005), http://www.littmankrooks.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/SEC-RestrictsSPAC-Managers-Warrant-Purchases.pdf.
424
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disclose the interest earned by the trust account.433 The SPAC files an 8-K
to announce an acquisition target,434 but until that announcement the SPAC
investor is generally about as informed as her counterpart in a venture or
buyout fund.435
E. Reputation and Serial Funds
While the shelf life of an individual fund or SPAC is limited,
successful managers in all three forms often create multiple funds within a
family to leverage past successes and reap the benefits that accrue to repeat
players.436
In their brief history, SPACs have been organized so close on each
others' heels that the reputational value seems limited.437 But we do see serial
SPAC sponsors who tout their past successes.438 For example, after Aldabra
Acquisition Corporation successfully acquired the Great Lakes Dredge &
Dock Corp., the same sponsors organized Aldabra 2 Acquisition Corp.,
Aldabra 3 Acquisition Corp., and Aldabra 4 Acquisition Corp.439 It remains
to be seen whether repeat SPAC sponsors will develop the reputational
capital we posit is so crucial in traditional private equity.440

433
See, e.g., Hicks Acquisition Co. II, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 7 (May 7,
2012) ("The Company has not generated any revenues, other than interest income earned on the
proceeds held in the trust account established in connection with the Offering.").
434
See Bonenfant, supra note 194.
435
See SEC Restricts SPAC Managers' Warrant Purchases, supra note 432, at 15 ("SPACs
regularly say in SEC filings before their public offerings that they have yet to find a company that
they would like to acquire. That's because it would be more difficult for a SPAC to go public if it
found an acquisition target first. The SPACs' filings with the SEC would then have to include
detailed disclosures about the target company's business and finances.").
436
See Riemer, supra note 45, at 958 n.182 (citation omitted) (quoting one equity manager
as stating that "when a bank is evaluating a SPAC, 'management is almost as important as the type
of structure used'").
437
See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
438
See Riemer, supra note 45, at 958 n.182.
439
See Aldabra 4 Acquisition Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Dec. 31, 2007);
Aldabra Acquisition Corp., Amendment No. 2 to Registration Statement (Form S-4) (Nov. 8, 2006)
(offering the merger of Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Holdings Corp.).
440
See supra notes 18, 22-25 (explaining the importance of reputation in traditional private
equity).
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F. Conflicts of Interest
One final difference between SPACs and traditional private equity
merits attention before we move to the larger questions of voice and exit.
Venture and buyout fund investors commonly use contractual constraints to
mitigate managers' conflicts of interest.441 In particular, venture funds place
limitations on GPs' abilities to invest their own money in portfolio
companies.442 This limitation makes sense because "[i]f general partners
invest in selected firms, they may devote excessive time to these firms and
may not terminate funding if the firms encounter difficulties."443 Other
contractual provisions, such as restrictions on outside activities and
requirements that GPs spend substantially all of their time managing the
fund, ensure that managers do not shirk their responsibilities.444 VCs also
limit co-investments with earlier funds of the same family to ensure that a
later fund is not propping up the poor choices of an earlier fund.445
In contrast, the original SPAC template specifies that management
will not devote much time to running the SPAC.446 SPACs disclose upfront
to investors that conflicts are possible, and even likely, in light of these
arrangements.447 Consider, for example, the following language appearing in
Bank St. Telecom Funding Corp.'s S-1:
Our officers and directors are currently and may in the future
become affiliated with entities, including other "blank check"
companies, engaged in business activities similar to those
intended to be conducted by us. . . . Our officers and directors
may become aware of business opportunities that may be
appropriate for presentation to us as well as the other entities
with which they are or may be affiliated. . . . Accordingly, they

441
See Gompers & Lerner, The Use of Covenants, supra note 160, at 481-84 (describing
the clashes that can exist between general partners and limited partners).
442
See id. at 481.
443
Id.
444
See, e.g., id. at 482 (explaining how investors may take care of conflicted management
problems); see also Sahlman, supra note 9, at 492-93 (listing some common restrictions in
management contracts). Such restrictions often apply for the first few years of the fund or until a
set percentage of the funds has been invested. Gompers & Lerner, The Use of Covenants, supra
note 160, at 482.
445
Gompers & Lerner, The Use of Covenants, supra note 160, at 480-81.
446
See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
447
See, e.g., Bank St. Telecom Funding Corp., Form S-1, supra note 185, at 12 (stating
outright that conflicts are possible).
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may have conflicts of interests in determining to which entity a
particular business opportunity may be presented. We cannot
assure you that these conflicts will be resolved in our favor.448
HCM's S-1 states that "[o]ur officers and directors may tend to favor
potential initial business combinations with target businesses that offer to
reimburse any expenses that we did not have the funds to reimburse
ourselves."449 Consider also the following language appearing on Alpha
Security Group's S-1:
Since our directors own shares of our common stock which will
be released from escrow only in certain limited situations, our
board may have a conflict of interest in determining whether a
particular target business is appropriate to effect a business
combination. The personal and financial interests of our
directors and officers may influence their motivation in
identifying and selecting a target business and completing a
business combination timely.450
The difference in strategy is striking. In traditional private equity
firms, conflicts are painstakingly circumscribed. In the SPAC context,
conflicts are cheerfully acknowledged. The investor is informed of their
existence and warned to proceed at her own risk.451 The manager may slack
off or make decisions for his personal interest.452
To the extent the SPAC model works, it must be because other
investor protections—the trust account, the liquidity provided by the public
market, SEC regulation, etc.—counteract the contractual freedom of

448

Id.; see also Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Form S-1, supra note 184, at 13-14 (stating similar

language).

449

HCM Acquisition Co., Form S-1, supra note 186, at 86.
Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Form S-1, supra note 184, at 48.
451
See supra notes 446-50 and accompanying text.
452
See supra notes 446-50 and accompanying text. There are hints, in the last quarter of
2011, that this tolerance of conflicts of interest might be changing. See, e.g., Chart Acquisition
Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 4 (Oct. 13, 2011) ("[O]ur officers and directors have
agreed not to participate in the formation of, or become an officer or director of, any blank check
company until we have entered into a definitive agreement regarding our initial business
combination or we have failed to complete our initial business combination within 21 months from
the date of this prospectus."); HBC Acquisition Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 5
(Sept. 6, 2011) (stating similar language); ROI Acquisition Corp., Registration Statement (Form S1), at 7 (Oct. 14, 2011) (stating similar language).
450
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managers to act in their own interest. We now turn to the two chief
protections for SPAC investors: voice and exit.
VII. EVOLUTION IN INNOVATION: VOICE AND EXIT IN SPACS
Beyond the investor protections detailed in Part VI of this Article,
there are two obvious mechanisms for disciplining managers: (1) giving
investors a say on the investment,453 and (2) allowing investors to commit
capital in stages—i.e., to withhold a portion of the investment if the
managers underperform,454 and exit if the going gets rough.455 These
mechanisms are conspicuously absent from traditional private equity contract
designs.456 Fund investors have no real voice in managing the funds they
own.457 And, while staged investments—a form of exit where initial capital
commitments are only partially funded up front—are the norm, funds punish
cold-footed investors by diluting their positions.458 In addition, the
reputational costs of defaulting on a capital call are high—investors who
renege on their commitments might find themselves frozen out of future
funds.459
In contrast, SPAC entrepreneurs broke the private equity mold by
allowing their investors both voice and exit. As to voice, shareholders had a
formal vote on a proposed acquisition and a second de facto vote via the
conversion threshold.460 And SPAC investors enjoyed not only the liquidity

453

rights).

See supra note 188 and accompanying text (discussing the SPAC shareholders' voting

454
See Douglas S. Ellenoff, Generation III—The New Mechanics of SPACs, ELLENOFF
GROSSMAN & SCHOLE LLP, 11 (2010), http://www.egsllp.com/DSESPACArticle.pdf (describing
a SPAC's "redemption threshold").
455
See supra note 177 (discussing the SPAC shareholders' rights to receive their money back
if they vote against the acquisition); see also Riemer, supra note 45, at 960 ("[T]he worst-case
scenario for SPAC investors is that they are refunded the portion of their initial investment that had
been accruing interest in escrow, instead of the more dramatic potential returns of a merger.").
456
See supra notes 87-88, 137 and accompanying text (stating that investors in venture and
LBO funds have limited rights).
457
See supra notes 87-88, 137.
458
See, e.g., Stephen Harris, Overlooking Private Equity Partnerships Can Be Costly
Mistake Secondary Market Offers Liquidity for Limited Partners, TURNAROUND MGMT. ASS'N
(Nov. 1, 2006), http://www.turnaround.org/Publications/Articles.aspx?objectID=6735 ("Once a
limited partner makes a commitment to a fund, it cannot withdraw or otherwise discontinue its
participation without incurring onerous penalties.").
459
See, e.g., David Rosenberg, The Two "Cycles" of Venture Capital, 28 J. CORP. L. 419,
421 (2003) (describing how both GPs and LPs are incentivized to avoid developing a negative
reputation).
460
See, e.g., Riemer, supra note 45, at 954-55 ("Unless a majority of investors affirmatively
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of publicly traded stock, but also the guarantee of 85% of their initial
investment if they held until acquisition or dissolution.461 These powerful
investor protections made the investment vehicle attractive to initial
investors, but turned out to make it much harder to get a deal done (i.e., to
actually acquire a target).462 Without reputational constraints limiting
investor opportunism, SPAC managers found themselves vulnerable to
holdup.463
To orient readers, we remind them of some key historical dates. From
the beginning of the second wave of SPACs in May 2003, SPACs grew
steadily in number until July 1, 2005, when AMEX began to list them on its
exchange.464 The form then exploded, with sixty-seven S-1s filed leading to
fifty-five IPOs in 2005, forty-seven S-1s and thirty-five IPOs in 2006, and
seventy-four S-1s leading to forty-four IPOs in 2007.465 The NYSE and
NASDAQ allowed SPACs to list in 2008, but the financial crisis meant that
very few SPACS were formed after the second quarter of 2008, and fewer
still went public.466
In the post-crisis period, SPACs have reemerged from dormancy.467
These new SPACs have developed significantly different provisions to
respond to the problems of hedge fund vote gaming and greenmailing.468
One SPAC, 57th Street General Acquisition Corporation, went public in
2009, and in May 2011 it acquired Crumbs Holdings LLC, a New Yorkbased gourmet cupcake seller.469 Seven other SPACS went public in 2010
approve a combination, and less than twenty percent of investors vote against the combination, the
fund is dissolved and investors are entitled to a pro rata share of the escrow account.").
461
See id. at 945 & n.96 (stating that 85-95% was the amount in trust); id. at 954-55 (stating
how the investor's input determines the outcome of the SPAC).
462
Neuhauser, supra note 367 ("One of the main impediments in consummating
SPACquisitions in 2008/09 was the redemption threshold which provided that a business
combination could not proceed unless a majority of the public shareholders approved a deal and that
no more than 30% (or some other specified %) of the public shareholders requested their capital
returned.").
463
See supra notes 62, 190 and accompanying text.
464
See supra notes 235-38 and accompanying text.
465
See supra note 239 and accompanying text; infra Table 4.
466
See supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text.
467
See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
468
See supra note 207 (discussing the "greenmailing" problem); Neuhauser, supra note 367
(describing how modern SPACs are evolving); see also Friedmann & Larson, supra note 62
("While conventional IPO investors eschewed SPAC offerings, many hedge funds sought out SPAC
investments. These hedge funds appear to have been attracted to SPACs by the opportunity to
profit on their investments through arbitrage trading strategies, rather than a buy and hold
approach.").
469
57th Street General Acquisition Corp., Owner of Crumbs Holdings LLC, Announces
Changes to Its Ticker Symbols, CRUMBS BAKE SHOP (May 10, 2011), http://investors.crumbs.com/

908

DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW

[Vol. 37

(and twenty-two in 2011), but it is too soon to tell if they will complete
acquisitions.470 We include the characteristics of this third generation of
SPACs471 in Table 4 below, but (with the exception of 57th Street) these
SPACs have emerged too recently for us to provide data on outcomes.
The public nature of SPACs allows us to track at a granular level
SPACs' grand experiment in giving public investors voice and exit.472
Outside the sheltered confines of traditional private equity, the market
provided continuous feedback into which features of the SPAC contract
design worked – and which did not.473
TABLE 4. MEAN CHARACTERISTICS OF SPACS BY YEAR
PRELIMINARY PROSPECTUS IS FILED
IPO proceeds ($mil)
Unit price
Warrant strike price
Strike prc. >
Unit prc.
Months for combo
Conversion
threshold
% in trust
Pvt. place./
IPO prcds.
% listed on OTC
No IPO
IPO, no acquisition
Acquisition
N
Total other IPOs474

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

$22
$6.00
$5.00
0%

$39
$6.32
$5.00
0%

$76
$7.17
$5.34
0%

$104
$7.74
$5.80
0%

$238
$9.55
$6.68
0%

$181
$9.74
$7.18
0%

$50
$10.00
$11.50
100%

$78
$8.57
$9.56
71%

$92
$10.00
$10.89
78%

24.0

23.1

23.5

24.0

26.8

28.9

15.0

21.4

23.0

20.0%

20.0%

20.7%

23.9%

32.5%

35.1%

88.0%

63.3%

74.4%

85.0%

86.2%

93.2%

97.7%

99%

99%

100%

97.2%

100%

0%

0%

1.4%

3.2%

3.1%

3.0%

3.7%

3.0%

4.3%

100%
0.0%
0.0%
100%
3
62

100%
0.0%
23.1%
76.9%
13
174

68.7%
17.9%
28.4%
53.7%
67
160

31.9%
25.5%
46.8%
27.7%
47
157

14.9%
40.5%
25.7%
33.8%
74
160

12.8%
100%
0.0%
0.0%
39
21

100%
1
41

85.7%
7
96

77.8%
22
NA

releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=575644.
470
See infra Table 4.
471
See Neuhauser, supra note 367 (referring to modern SPACs as "Generation III SPACs").
472
See id. (stating that "the resurgence [of SPACs] is due to the new structure of Generation
III SPACs first introduced in May 2010 with 57th Street Acquisition Corp's IPO . . . .") (emphasis
added).
473
See id.
474
Jay Ritter provides data on non-SPAC IPOs. He includes only IPOs with an offer price
of $5.00 or more; excluding ADRs, unit offerings (thus excluding all firms in our sample), closedend funds, REITs, partnerships, banks, S&Ls, and stocks not listed on CRSP. Jay R. Ritter, Initial
Public Offerings: Tables Updated Through 2010, 1-2 (Jan. 27, 2011), http://bear.warrington.ufl.
edu/ritter/IPOs2010Statistics111.pdf.
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A. Voice
Venture investors have little say over the individual investment
choices of fund managers.475 Some funds establish advisory boards, which
may have limited partner representation.476 Still, Professor Ronald J. Gilson
terms these boards "largely inconsequential."477 The GP has "virtually
complete control."478
The same is true in buyout funds. Indeed "[t]he reason for choosing
the limited partnership form is principally to limit the control rights that
limited partners will have over the partnership."479 Investors in the buyout
fund usually do not have much voting power.480 These investors typically
lack even the right to replace poorly performing managers.481 In the few
cases when an LP has control rights, she might have a "general reluctance"
to exercise them.482 As Spindler explains, "[m]any of the investors are repeat
players, such as funds-of-funds, insurance companies, pensions, and other
institutional investors, and do not want to acquire reputations as
troublemakers, which would deny them investment opportunities in the
future."483
In contrast, early SPACs provided robust control rights to investors.
First, these SPACs required a majority of shareholders to approve the
proposed acquisition in order for the acquisition to go through.484 Second,
even if a majority of shareholders approved the transaction, individual
shareholders who voted against it could exercise their right to receive their
pro rata portion of the escrowed funds if the combination occurred (a "put
right" or "right of rescission").485 This redemption right translated into a

475
See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 88, at 1088 ("Most important, the investors are prohibited
from insisting on an approval right of the GP's investment decisions.").
476
See id.
477
Id.
478
Id.
479
Spindler, supra note 133, at 328.
480
Ribstein, supra note 150, at 299.
481
See Spindler, supra note 133, at 328-29 ("[T]he limited partner has very little control
over what that capital is used for and usually very little right to replace management—or other such
remedies—subsequent to poor performance."). Private equity limited partners can step in, however,
"upon some fairly major event, such as the departure of key management personnel of the general
partner or the bad actions of the general partner." Id. at 329.
482
Id. at 330.
483
Id.
484
See Riemer, supra note 45, at 961-62.
485
See, e.g., id. at 945-46, 961 (noting a SPAC investor's "right of rescission" after the
acquisition is announced).
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secondary veto power because most SPACs specified that if a given
percentage of shares (the "conversion threshold") voted to redeem their
shares from the trust account, the acquisition would not go forward486—
effectively imposing a supermajority approval requirement.487
Most early SPACs hewed to a 20% conversion threshold.488 Looking
at Table 1 above, the lowest threshold observed was 20%; but within our
sample, 110 SPACs used this threshold. Notably, each of these 110 entities
was formed prior to February of 2007.489 Table 1 shows that that the median
conversion threshold for all entities, including those formed in later years, is
30%. The NYSE and NASDAQ both require that the threshold be no more
than 40%.490 The average conversion threshold in our sample in Table 1
above is 27.2%. As seen in Table 4 above, the mean conversion threshold
did not rise above 30% until 2007; and not until 2009 was the average above
50%.
Why have these changes occurred? These shareholder approval
provisions were important in convincing the SEC to allow SPACs to go
public,491 but they created an unintended consequence: a holdout right.492
During the recent financial crisis, investors became desperate for havens in
which to invest their money.493 SPACs' trust funds provided a safe harbor

486

See supra note 43 and accompanying text (explaining the investor's "conversion right").
See Joe Barbeau et al., Deal-Breakers, DAILY J.: FOCUS COLUMN 7 (2009), available at
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/Deal-Breakers.aspx (identifying the "difficulty
[in] getting supermajority approval (usually, 80 percent is required)" as a problem inherent in
SPACs).
488
See Riemer, supra note 45, at 954-55.
489
See, e.g., Pantheon China Acquisition Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 7
(Aug. 14, 2006) ("We will proceed with a business combination only if (i) a majority of the shares
of common stock voted by the public stockholders are voted in favor of the business combination
and (ii) public stockholders owning less than 20% of the shares sold in this offering exercise their
conversion rights . . . .").
490
Barker & Pflaum, supra note 381, at 5.
491
See Bonenfant, supra note 194 ("Historically, the SEC has been concerned about
development stage company filings as evidenced by the adoption of Rule 419. This concern is also
reflected in the SEC's review of the structural elements and features of SPAC offerings.").
492
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
493
See Harvey Jones, No Guaranteed Safety in Financial Safe Havens, THE NAT'L (May 5,
2012), http://www.thenational.ae/lifestyle/person-finance/no-guaranteed-safety-in-financial-safehavens ("In these troubled times, safety first is the motto for many investors. Nobody wants to lose
all their money in another banking, property, stock market or currency crash. Yet the world is
running out of safe havens."). Readers may remember that even money market funds began to seem
risky. After the oldest money market in the United States, the Reserve Primary Fund, "broke the
buck" (i.e., cut its share price to below $1.00), the Treasury Department stepped in to backstop these
investments. Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled
Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683, 1740-41 (2011).
487
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that made SPACs an increasingly attractive investment, regardless whether
an acquisition took place.494 Indeed, it was around this time that reports of
"greenmailing" emerged, as hedge funds realized that they could use the
power of withholding approval votes to gain concessions from SPAC
managers eager to close a deal.495 The business form then all but
disappeared.496 Not a single SPAC IPO occurred in all of 2008.497
In more recent years, SPACs have recreated themselves and
reemerged, addressing the problem of shareholder voice by taking it away.498
57th Street General Acquisition Corp., (“57th Street”), the first of these new
generation SPACs,499 provides a good example of the changing nature of
SPACs. The prospectus for 57th Street has no requirement of shareholder
approval by vote.500 Instead, it employs a tender offer mechanism, offering to
buy shares back from shareholders unhappy with the proposed transaction.501
The tender offer removes the holdup value from would-be hedge-fund
arbitrageurs; they can no longer threaten a negative vote to gain
consideration from the SPAC.502 If they want to cash out, they must put up
their shares.503 57th Street retains the conversion threshold concept, but the
level is high: the holders of more than 88% of shares must tender their shares

494
See The Cauldron: Healthcare Costs, Pension Funds, LBOs, SPACs and PIKs, THE
ECON. POPULIST, http://www.economicpopulist.org/content/cauldron-healthcare-costs-pensionfunds-lbos-spacs-and-piks ("The recent popularity of SPACs, which are a controversial
investment class due to their high risk characteristics, . . . appears due almost wholly to investor
demand for 'private equity-type' investment.").
495
See, e.g., Jonathan Keehner, For Blank-Check IPOs, Popularity Comes At a Price,
REUTERS (Feb. 25, 2008), http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USN2465188420080225
(discussing the issue of "activist investors" in SPACs completing acquisitions).
496
See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
497
See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
498
See Neuhauser, supra note 367 (stating that modern SPACs have "do[ne] away with the
shareholder approval process").
499
See supra note 472.
500
See 57th St. Gen. Acquisition Corp., Form S-1, supra note 333, at 58.
501
Id. ("Unless otherwise required by law, our stockholders will not have the opportunity
to vote on our business transaction. In the event we are required to seek stockholder approval in
connection with our initial business transaction, we will send each stockholder a proxy statement
containing information required by the SEC.").
502
See Order, supra note 190, 2010 WL 5301044, at *5-*6 (ruling that SPACs may pursue
the tender offer route if they wish).
503
See 57th St. Gen. Acquisition Corp, Form S-1, supra note 333, at 58 ("[A] stockholder
who follows the procedures described in the proxy statement will be given the right to put his shares
of common stock to us for a pro rata share of the trust account."). Note that the initial
mechanism described was a "put right," but the SEC required 57th Street to conduct a tender
offer. See id.
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in order for the business combination to fail.504 If fewer than the 88%
threshold amount of shareholders tender their shares, the deal goes
through.505 Furthermore, 57th Street included a "bulldog provision,"506
restricting the right to tender shares to holders of less than 10% of the
shares.507 The S-1 observed:
We believe this restriction will discourage stockholders from
accumulating large blocks of shares, and subsequent attempts
by such holders to use their put right as a means to force us or
our management to purchase their shares at a significant
premium to the then current market price or on other
undesirable terms.508
Our data show this evolution. As seen in Table 4 above, in the post2007 period, the lowest average conversion threshold is 63.3% in 2010, with
the highest conversion threshold set at 88% for the lone SPAC of 2009 we
observed. This change has shifted power over acquisition decisions to
SPAC managers in a dramatic way.509 We argue in Part VIII of this Article
that this loss of the vote occurred because the vote became more trouble than
it was worth to shareholders, given the other protections SPACs afforded
their investment. The next section explains why.
B. Exit
Exit refers to the ability to get out of an investment that has gone
sour. Venture and buyout funds provide their investors with limited exit
rights—or at least, the right to limit their losses by staging their
investments.511 However, exercising the right not to contribute further can
510

504

57th St. Gen. Acquisition Corp, Form S-1, supra note 333, at 52.
See id.
506
This term is coined after Bulldog Investors. See Ted Wallace, Hedge Fund Activism
Extends to SPACs, HARV. LAW SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Feb. 1, 2009,
10:03 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/02/01/hedge-fund-activism-extends-tospacs/#more-840 ("[M]any SPACs now incorporate a 'bulldog' provision – preventing any investor
(or group) from holding more than 10% of the shell company to exercise conversion rights (and thus
force the scuttle of an already-approved merger).").
507
See 57th St. Gen. Acquisition Corp, Form S-1, supra note 333, at 11.
508
Id.
509
See supra notes 498-508 and accompanying text.
510
See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 56, at 4.
511
See Litvak, Governance Through Exit, supra note 9, at 772-73 (stating that venture
505
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be costly.512 Professor Kate Litvak has documented the punitive dilution that
funds impose for failure to invest more.513 In addition, the reputational costs
of failing to meet capital calls is often steep because investors tend to be
repeat players who can be cut out of later transactions.514 In short, the holdback right in traditional private equity imposes some discipline upon poorly
performing managers, but it is a weak right at best. 515
In contrast to traditional private equity, SPACs provide investors a
highly meaningful form of exit. SPACs characteristically agree to hold 90%
or more of the offering proceeds in escrow, as Rule 419 requires.516 These
funds in turn cannot be used for the company's day-to-day operations
(although the interest earned thereon may be),517 and must be invested in
government obligations or treasury securities.518 To protect the trust value,
SPACs generally obtain waivers from vendors and targets on any claims to
the escrowed funds.519 As seen in Table 1 above, the percent held in trust
ranges from a low of 82.8% to a high of 110%, with a mean and median of
96.3% and 98%, respectively. Most of these percentages exceed those
required by the AMEX (which requires that at least 85% of the funds be
placed in escrow)520 and the NASDAQ and NYSE (which set a 90%
threshold).521 If the SPAC fails to locate a target and gain shareholder
approval for that target’s acquisition, then each shareholder receives a pro
capitalist can stage their investments).
512
See id. (stating that a venture capitalist investor's default may be unwise).
513
See id. at 808-09 (explaining the factors that correlate with "weaker investor walkaway
rights").
514
See Victor Fleischer, Fickle Investors, Reputation, and the Clientele Effect in Venture
Capital Funds, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 813, 817 (2004).
515
See id. We can find little data on whether buyout funds also stage investments and
impose similar punishments on investors who fail to meet capital calls, but several sources indicate
that this is the case. See, e.g., Spindler, supra note 133, at 330 ("[E]ven where some degree of
control exists, there appears to be a general reluctance to exert control rights.").
516
Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 758.
517
See, e.g., HCM Acquisition Co., Form S-1, supra note 186, at 79 (noting that interest
income may be used to pay income taxes and up to $3 million can fund working capital
requirements).
518
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.419(b)(2)(i)-(iv) (2011).
519
William H. Hinman, Jr., Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations, in SPECIAL
PURPOSE ACQUISITION CORPORATIONS, at 510 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series, No. 14864, 2008); see also Bank St. Telecom Funding Corp., Form S-1, supra note 185,
at 9.
520
Mark Cecil, State Attorneys General: Set to Attack SPACs, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS
REPORT, at 1 (Aug. 22, 2005).
521
Camille Formosa et al., SPACs 2.0: New SPAC Rules Changes Approved By NASDAQ
And NYSE AMEX And New Market Features Make SPACs A More Attractive Investment Vehicle In
2011, MARTINDALE.COM (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.martindale.com/securities-law/article_Shep
pard-Mullin-Richter-Hampton-LLP_1258884.htm.
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rata share of these escrowed funds.522 Thus, the more funds that a SPAC can
hold in trust, the more attractive a SPAC will become to an investor—the
higher the percentage in trust, the less risk to the investment.523
As demonstrated in Table 4 above, this avoidance of loss makes the
(unreported) standard deviation of 4.5% a non-trivial amount of variation
when viewed as a percentage loss over a 24-month period. As the table
shows, there is an increase in the average percent of proceeds kept in the
trust account, rising in a linear fashion from a low of 85% in 2003 to an
average of 99% in 2007 and 2008. In 2009 and 2011 the average is 100%,
while it is 97.2% in 2010.
This average percent of the proceeds from the IPO increases due to
two sources of cash. The first is private placements of warrants by managers,
which was discussed in Part VI.A of this Article—the "skin in the game."524
In Table 4 above, we show that these private placements began to appear in
SPAC offerings in 2005 and now represent a relatively small, but growing,
proportion of proposed IPO proceeds, ranging from a low of 1.4% in 2005 to
a high of 4.3% in 2011. Second, SPAC underwriters began offering to defer
a portion of their compensation until the hoped-for acquisition actually
closed.525 Underwriters are generally quite resistant to negotiating down this
portion of their compensation—the so-called "discount" at which they buy
the shares from the corporation before selling them to the public at full
price.526 In future work we will explore the implications of the banks'
willingness to defer this typically fixed portion of underwriter compensation.
As the SPAC evolved, the trust account became more and more
important.527 The ability to offer investors an increasingly "cheap look" at an
investment, if not an entirely "free look," apparently outweighed the loss of

522

See Riemer, supra note 45, at 954-55.
See Barker & Hedin, supra note 43, at 38.
524
See supra Part VI.A.2.
525
Heyman, supra note 401, at 546.
526
See Riemer, supra note 45, at 954 n.162 ("An investor's pro rata share is equal to the total
amount of funds held in escrow, plus any interest earned, less any amount held in escrow
representing a portion of the underwriter's discount . . . .") (emphasis added); Andres Rueda, The
Hot IPO Phenomenon and the Great Internet Bust, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 21, 30-31 (2001)
("[U]nder the cartel-like price structure that prevailed among the half-dozen or so market players that
dominated investment banking during the Internet boom, the usual fee was a flat, non-negotiable
seven percent underwriter's discount.").
527
See Neuhauser, supra note 367 (stating that in modern SPACs, "from the investor point
of view, all of the funds continue to be protected in a trust account and they continue to be provided
with the right to a return of their capital").
523
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protections afforded by shareholder voting rights.528 From the firm's
perspective, the trust account provides a pool of collective capital that serves
as currency for an acquisition and a check on managerial discretion.529
SPACs generally finance their acquisitions using a combination of the
unclaimed capital in the trust account and newly issued stock.530 Even in
Third Generation SPACs, where the conversion threshold is high, if too
many SPAC shareholders tender their shares, then the scant equity available
for the deal might well make targets reluctant to go through with the
acquisition.531 The threat of this reluctance will, in turn, discipline fund
managers to pursue those deals built around maximizing shareholder
returns.532
In sum, SPAC entrepreneurs enticed would-be investors by offering
voice and exit, two notable deviations from the traditional private equity
contract design. The voice experiment fell prey to investor opportunism;
unconstrained by reputation, empowered investors quickly morphed into
holdup artists.533 Exit, however, proved to be a valuable constraint on
managers by giving unhappy investors the right to walk away.534

528
See id.; see also Dennis Dick, Can the J-Shaped Liquidity Curve Write a Prescription?,
CFA MAGAZINE, 28 (Sept.-Oct. 2011), available at http://premarketinfo.com/in-the-media/
(discussing a general "cheap look"). The trust account can fruitfully be viewed in a number of ways.
From the perspective of the individual investor, it creates a kind of option on a subsequent, yet-tobe-determined acquisition. See Neuhauser, supra note 367. The option takes an unusual form, in
that the full purchase price is paid up front: what the initial investor buys is a robust option to
abandon the investment, that is, to receive almost all her money back if she dislikes the acquisition
the SPAC management proposes. See Riemer, supra note 45, at 954 & n.162, 955 (explaining what
the dissenting investor receives). Looked at in this way, for the purchase of a SPAC with a unit
price of $10.00 and a trust value of $9.75, $0.25 is the price for the option to abandon the
investment. See Tim Jenkinson & Miguel Sousa, Why SPAC Investors Should Listen to the Market,
at *10 (February 12, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1331383. But SPAC shares are
traded publicly, and as such present daily opportunities to sell—in that sense, the option to abandon
is inherent in being publicly listed. See id.
529
See Order, supra note 190, 2010 WL 5301044, at *3 ("[S]PACs often use stock as
consideration for the business combination and cash in the trust account is used to redeem
shareholders and possibly finance the operation of the target.").
530
See id.
531
See Wittlin & Ferris, supra note 241, at 4 ("Some SPAC targets, however, may not wish
to close a transaction with a SPAC that has substantially less cash than originally anticipated, even if
the ownership percentage of the SPAC's shares by the target's stockholders is increased to reflect
the reduced amount of cash in the SPAC.").
532
See id.
533
See supra notes 485-88, 495 and accompanying text.
534
See supra note 528 and accompanying text.
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C. The Case of EarlyBirdCapital, Inc.535
Before we move to consider the implications of the changes in
contractual design that we see in SPACs, we must consider one question:
does the change we observe in SPAC structure result from the entry of new
investment banks, bringing with them idiosyncratic innovations to SPAC
structures, or is it a more widespread change in the way that SPACs are
structured in response to competitive pressures? The answer to this question
is important; if the change is due to new entrants, then any argument that
SPAC structure has evolved for particular reasons (i.e., problems of hedge
fund vote gaming and "greenmailing")536 is weak. New, innovative SPACs
might exist side by side with old-style SPACs, resulting in an aggregate of
data and creating the illusion of evolution from mere multiplicity. However,
if we observe the structure of SPACs changing for a particular underwriter
over time, then the argument for this change being attributable to general
evolution, instead of mere diversity of industry, becomes more convincing.
In Table 5 below, we examine the characteristics of SPACs in which
the lead underwriter is EarlyBirdCapital—the innovator, and second most
prolific lead underwriter, of SPACs in our sample period.537 Most of the
characteristics of EarlyBirdCapital's deals exhibit the same shift as the
general SPAC population.538 For example, as seen from the table, the
conversion threshold for EarlyBirdCapital transactions remained at or near
20% until 2007 and 2008, when it doubled to 40%. In the three transactions
after this period, in 2010 and 2011, the conversion threshold increased to
80% and 90%, respectively.

535
The SPAC is actually a trademark of EarlyBirdCapital, Inc. See SPAC,
EARLYBIRDCAPITAL, http://www.earlybirdcapital.com/spacs.html (last visited Sept 14, 2012).
536
See supra note 495 and accompanying text.
537
See ICR To Host Conference Call To Discuss Special Purpose Acquisition Companies,
BUSINESSWIRE (Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter ICR to Host], http://www.businesswire.com/
news/home/20060130005545/en/ICR-Host-Conference-Call-Discuss-Special-Purpose (stating that
the SPAC is "a trademark of EarlyBirdCapital Inc.").
538
Compare supra Table 4 (presenting characteristics of general SPACs) with infra Table 5
(presenting characteristics of EarlyBirdCapital, Inc. specifically).
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TABLE 5. MEAN SPAC CHARACTERISTICS WHEN
EARLYBIRDCAPITAL, INC. IS LEAD UNDERWRITER
IPO proceeds ($mil)
Unit price
Warrant strike price
Strike prc. > Unit prc.
Months for combo
Conversion threshold
% in trust
Pvt. place./IPO prcds.
% listed on the OTC
N

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

$21.0
$6.0
$5.0
0%
24
20%
85%
0%
100%
2

$27.4
$6.0
$5.0
0%
24
20%
85.8%
0%
100%
7

$41.2
$6.0
$5.0
0%
24
20%
87.7%
0.3%
88.9%
9

$41.1
$6.6
$5.0
0%
24
23%
95.2%
3.9%
100%
7

$66.3
$8.0
$5.4
0%
27
40%
99.3%
4.5%
75.0%
4

$49.0
$8.0
$6.0
0%
30
40%
97.2%
2.1%
100%
2

0

$44.3
$6.0
$6.0
50%
22.5
80%
97.7%
2.4%
50%
2

$50.0
$10.0
$7.5
0%
24
90%
101%
6.2%
0%
1

In addition, as the statistics suggest, the ability to offer investors a
relatively riskless investment with significant upside potential became more
important in EarlyBirdCapital transactions, just as it gained in importance in
the full sample of SPACs, as shown in Table 4 above. As seen in Table 5,
the percent held in trust increased each year from 85% in 2003 to 99.3% in
2007 and again from 97.2% in 2008 to 101% in 2011. As suggested above,
these increases came alongside increased participation by managers in the
form of private placements,539 which Table 5 shows first appeared in the
EarlyBird transactions in 2005. Also noticeable from the data is that the
percent of the private placement amount relative to the amount of IPO
proceeds increased over time: moving from 0% to 4.5% from 2003 to 2007,
and from 2.1% to 6.2% from 2008 to 2011.
On the whole, the characteristics of the SPACs underwritten by
EarlyBird in Table 5 change in the same manner as that of the general
population of SPACs in Table 4. This pattern for EarlyBird is consistent
with the changing of SPAC structure to eliminate the vote and increase the
percentage held in trust.540 Therefore, we conclude that the pattern we see of
emphasizing exit and discounting voice is an industry-wide phenomenon.
Of additional importance is the lack of speed with which EarlyBird
modified its SPAC structures, which suggests that SPACs' structural
evolution was driven, in part, through competition.541 Though EarlyBird

539

See supra notes 369-71 and accompanying text.
See supra Part VII.A-B.
541
See ICR to Host, supra note 537 ("While EarlyBirdCapital was the early leader in
540
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introduced the SPAC structure, it was slow to change.542 EarlyBird was the
lead underwriter for five of the first six, and fourteen of the first thirty,
SPACs.543 However, it was the third underwriter to list its SPAC on a more
prominent exchange than the OTC and did not do so until its thirteenth
transaction.544 Only after fourteen transactions by other underwriters with
conversion thresholds greater than 20% did EarlyBird underwrite an IPO
with a conversion threshold in this higher range.545 Only after twenty-seven
transactions by other underwriters with trust accounts greater than 90% did
EarlyBird follow suit—it was its eighteenth SPAC in our sample period.546
Last, it was the twelfth firm to underwrite a SPAC in which there was a
private placement of shares.547 Thus, one can reasonably conclude that
competition for the underwriting services to SPACs, and the associated fees,
is a primary driver of the observed changes in SPAC structure. The initial
innovator changed the features of its original template in response to outside
pressures.548 We plan to focus future work on the insights SPACs provide on
the role of the underwriter in the public offering.
VIII. IMPLICATIONS: REPUTATION, VOICE, AND EXIT
SPAC entrepreneurs had a revolutionary idea. They took the
delicately balanced, emphatically private, financial contract between private
equity investor and manager and transplanted it to the public market. This
radical move promised new opportunities for all. Fund managers who either
chafed in the confines of the traditional private equity fund structure or who
had a limited track record would be free to pursue their own deals, unfettered
by the demands of established private equity funds.549 The general public
would finally get a chance to invest in funds that take private companies
public.550 Lastly, targets would have a cheaper method to access the capital
markets.551
brining SPACs to market, many other investment banks . . . have recently priced deals.").
542
See id. (detailing the history of SPACs).
543
See id. ("In 1993 and 1994 Early[B]ird Capital[] took 13 SPACs public, only one of
which was liquidated."); see also Completed SPAC Offerings, EARLYBIRDCAPITAL,
http://www.earlybirdcapital.com/offerings.html (listing post-2003 SPACs).
544
See supra Table 5.
545
See supra Table 5.
546
See supra Table 5.
547
See supra Table 5.
548
See supra Table 5, note 541 and accompanying text.
549
See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
550
See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
551
See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
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Things didn't work out as expected. We argue in this Part that
reputation was the vital private equity ingredient SPACs could not recreate
in the public market. The "one-shot deal" nature of the SPAC removed the
reputational constraint on fund managers, and the public nature of the
markets eliminated the reputational constraint on investors.552 The financial
contract was forced to develop substitutes for reputation;553 it remains to be
seen how successful these substitutes will prove.
Finally, we explore what light SPACs shed on the relationship
between voice and exit. Hirschman posited in 1970 that the easier the ability
to exit, the less likely that the power of voice will be exercised.554 Recent
literature suggests that, although conventional wisdom is that voting in the
typical corporation is of little value, voting in mutual funds may be even less
effective because exit is relatively easier.555 The elimination of the SPAC
acquisition vote contributes empirical evidence to support the claim that
shareholders are indifferent to a vote if the exit is cheap enough.
First we turn to the role of reputation. Thus far, we have focused, by
design, on the investor/fund contract. This focus has given us a somewhat
distorted perspective because prospective private equity investors are
focused on the probability of success on the fund, which ultimately depends
on the success of the underlying portfolio.556 As Part II discussed, Ron
Gilson describes the crucial role of reputation in the "braided" relationships
between investor/fund and fund/portfolio-company.557 Funds do not
exploit the companies they invest in because if traditional funds act
opportunistically, they will not be able to make further investments and,
ultimately, will not be able to raise subsequent funds.558 Because private
equity companies' business model hinges on raising multiple funds and
capitalizing on scale and scope economies, reputation matters.559
SPACs are new—the first SPAC sponsors had no reputation, at least
regarding this new form.560 Moreover, SPACs are one-shot, especially

552

See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text; Neuhauser, supra note 367.
554
See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 56, at 34.
555
See Morley & Curtis, supra note 61, at 89-90.
556
See supra notes 151-61 and accompanying text.
557
See supra notes 152-53.
558
Gilson, supra note 88, at 1092.
559
See supra Part II.C.
560
See Karen Richardson & Peter Lattman, Financiers Now Say 'Trust Us' Like the BlankCheck Companies of Yore, SPAC Investors Are Asked to Buy In – on Faith, THE WALL STREET J., 2
Feb. 1, 2007, available at http://www.ladenburg.com/uploads/LTS%2002-01-07.pdf (stating that
investors use a strategy called "bet on the jockey," in which everything hinges on the identity of the
553
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compared to traditional private equity, and so reputation does not constrain
managers.561 While return SPAC entrepreneurs do exist, when each SPAC is
launched there is no expectation of a follow-up by the same managers.562
Prospective target companies have little reputational capital to rely upon
when considering whether to consent to acquisition by a SPAC.563
A revealing sign of the importance of reputation is that, after the first wave
of SPACs, prospectuses were quick to inform investors when their managers
had successfully led SPACs in the past, as opposed to simply relying on past
business success.564
We interpret the evolution in SPAC managerial compensation as a
response to the need for a substitute for reputational capital. One striking
takeaway from our data is the extent to which the original SPAC template
hewed to the "magic 20%" compensation for managers: 211 of our 260
SPACs, or 81% of our sample, receive exactly 20% of the corporation, and
19 more are within 5% of that number.565 This marked clustering around
20% indicates that the SPAC sponsors aspire to be like their traditional
private equity cousins, and expect to be compensated accordingly.566
Particularly since they are not charging a 2% management fee to investors,567
the 20% incentive, analogous to private equity's "carry,"568 seemed vital at
the outset.
And yet 20% awarded solely for a single acquisition proved overly
generous for the market. As discussed below, the market evolved in two
ways: first, it required the managers to stump up the "skin in the game" they
originally left out. Second, it has begun to condition the managerial 20% on
more concrete performance.
managers because nothing is known about actual SPAC).
561
See Thompson, supra note 33, at 12-13 ("[U]nlike private equity managers, SPAC
sponsors are not necessarily going back to investors to raise funds again. Sponsors infrequently
express the intent to maintain an active role in the acquired firm, and have the easy option of
returning full time to the outside employment that they have maintained throughout their tenure
with the SPAC.").
562
See id.
563
See Heyman, supra note 401, at 533-34 (stating that under the "bet on the jockey" theory,
"high profile names that are likely to attract investment" are really the only thing the SPAC has
going for it).
564
See, e.g., Aldabra 4 Acquisition Corp., Form S-1, supra note 439, at 70 ("Each of our
executive officers and certain of our directors has been involved in other blank check companies.").
565
See supra Part VI.A.1.
566
See, e.g., Sahlman, supra note 9, at 491 (stating that in venture capital funds, 20% is the
norm).
567
See, e.g., Riemer, supra note 45, at 959 (citation omitted) ("SPAC managers do not
receive salaried compensation or management fee.").
568
See supra notes 105-13 and accompanying text.
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Beginning with the "skin in the game," at first the SPAC sponsors
only paid a nominal amount for their 20% interest.569 Perhaps they, like
some scholars, viewed the 1% managerial investment in venture capital and
LBO funds to be an "artifact of tax history,"570 and therefore dispensable. In
contrast, now the sponsors invest significant capital, which they forfeit if a
business combination does not materialize.571 The SPAC sponsors now pay
for the funds' operating expenses, allowing the trust account to grow to ever
higher levels.572 In effect, they are now posting a bond as to their own
performance; exposed to a downside risk, they reassure investors that they
too have personal assets at stake.573
As discussed, there is some debate as to the importance of skin in the
game in the traditional private equity contract.574 In SPACs it is vital. SPAC
managers risk their reputations to some degree, but because they are oneshot transactions, investors cannot rely on the built-up reputational capital of
prior funds and other funds from the same company.575 A manager's
personal investment thus became a bond, ensuring that the promoters risked
losing something of real value.576 This reassurance matters both to SPAC
investors and to targets.
Another recent SPAC development, the imposition of performance
hurdles, similarly substitutes for reputation. The founders of the newest
SPACs will forfeit their shares unless the stock price attains certain preset
levels.577 Thus, the managers receive their full 20%, not when the target is

569
See, e.g., Riemer, supra note 45, at 959 (discussing management compensation within
the SPAC).
570
Fleischer, supra note 100, at 82 n.25 ("Before the check-the-box rules, a 1% capital
interest was necessary to help ensure partnership classification for tax purposes."); see also
Sahlman, supra note 9, at 488 ("Typically, the general partners provide only a small proportion
(about 1%) of the capital raised by a given fund.").
571
See, e.g., SCG Fin. Acquisition Corp., Amendment No. 3 to Registration Statement
(Form S-1/A), at 37 (Apr. 1, 2011) ("[O]ur sponsor has committed to purchase an aggregate of
4,666,667 sponsor warrants, each exercisable for one share of our common stock at $11.50 per
share, for a purchase price of $3.5 million, or $0.75 per warrant, that will also be worthless if we do
not consummate a business combination."); see also Wittlin & Ferris, supra note 241, at 3.
572
See Barker & Hedin, supra note 43, at 38 ("Approximately 85-100% of the proceeds
raised in the IPO are held in trust to be used to fund the initial business combination. Earlier deals
tended to put 85% in trust. More recent deals are placing between 95-100% in trust . . . .").
573
See id. ("By placing a greater amount in trust, deals are providing greater protection for
investors, coupled with greater risk for insiders and underwriters.").
574
See supra note 570 and accompanying text.
575
See supra notes 560, 563 and accompanying text.
576
See Barker & Hedin, supra note 43, at 38.
577
See, e.g., Chart Acquisition Corp., Form S-1, supra note 452, at 6 ("A number of
founder shares in an amount equal to 2.5% of our shares of common stock issued and outstanding
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acquired, but when the public corporation proves its worth in the market.578
Like "skin in the game," performance hurdles reassure both investors and
targets that the SPAC promoter is committed for the long haul.579 We are no
longer in the world of the "magic 20." While the manager earns some of his
20% upon acquisition, 5% in the most recent SPACs is conditioned on the
investment actually proving profitable to all parties.580
Just as investors and targets felt the loss of traditional private equity's
reputational constraints on SPAC managers, so too did SPAC managers
suffer from the lack of reputational constraints on investor opportunism in
the new form.581 In the first generation of SPACs, shareholders could voice
their objections to an acquisition via vote, and they could also walk away,
even from an approved acquisition, while still receiving the bulk of their
investment back from the SPAC trust account.582 While these rights may
have seemed good in theory, in practice they were redundant because of all
of the other protections of a SPAC (i.e. the short timeline, the 80% in the
trust account requirement).583 Worse yet, rather than being a "belt" to the
"suspenders" protection of the trust account, the shareholder vote became a
noose around the SPAC manager's neck. As we saw, the initial
supermajority vote, with a 20% conversion threshold, created the possibility
for strategic behavior on the part of shareholders.584
The conversion threshold creates a moral hazard problem for the
SPAC investor analogous to the traditional private equity investor's ability to
renege on capital commitments.585 Remember, as Part II of this Article
described, private equity investment involved only a limited capital outlay at
the beginning.586 Opportunistic investors might be tempted to treat their
commitment like an option and not respond to future capital calls.587
after expiration of the underwriters' overallotment option (excluding the placement shares) are
subject to forfeiture by our sponsor in the event the last sales price of our stock does not equal or
exceed $11.50 per share . . . ."); ROI Acquisition Corp., Form S-1, supra note 452, at 9 (stating
similar language).
578
See Chart Acquisition Corp., Form S-1, supra note 452, at 6.
579
See Barker & Hedin, supra note 43, at 38.
580
See, e.g., Chart Acquisition Corp., Form S-1, supra note 452, at 6 (stating that 2.5% is
conditioned on one price, and another 2.5% is conditioned on a higher price).
581
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
582
Riemer, supra note 45, at 954-55, 960.
583
See id. at 953-55 (listing the available protections in a SPAC).
584
See Order, supra note 190, 2010 WL 5301044, at *5-*7 (discussing the problem of
"greenmailing").
585
See, e.g., supra notes 21-22, 24-25 and accompanying text (describing the reputational
constraints on private equity funds).
586
See, e.g., supra note 21 (detailing how staged investments work).
587
See, e.g., id. (describing how private investors might renege on their promises).
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As discussed above in Part II of this Article, reputational considerations
constrain such opportunism on the part of investors. As would-be repeat
players, accredited investors will fulfill their promises because they fear
being shut out of subsequent investment opportunities.588
SPAC investors have no such scruples. Because SPACs trade in the
open market, SPAC managers have no control over the identity of their
investors.589 Initially, they felt free to extort SPAC managers with their new
supermajority power.590 To address the reputational deficit, SPAC sponsors
developed tactics like "bulldog"591 provisions that limit stockholders from
voting or converting more than 10% of their stock.592 Further, they raised the
conversion threshold,593 effectively eliminating the majority vote entirely.594
We argue that these moves are adaptive responses to the lack of reputational
constraints in the public markets, and that they reinforce the importance of
investor reputation in traditional private equity. Bereft of the reputational
constraint on investor opportunism, SPAC managers quickly learned to be
more sparing in granting investor rights.595
Besides casting light on the importance of reputation in private equity
contract design, SPACs' evolution allows for insights into the relative
strengths of two classic strategies to mitigate agency costs: voice and exit.596

588
See, e.g., supra notes 22, 24-25 (explaining that problems can occur for private equity
investors who renege).
589
See Davidoff, supra note 4, at 227-28 ("[T]he SPAC phenomenon has been publicly
attributed and promoted as a private equity substitute, one the public can now freely access.").
Therefore, because the SPAC does not handpick its investors, such investors are not concerned
with maintaining a good reputation amongst SPAC managers. See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 756;
Davidoff, supra note 4, at 227-28.
590
See Order, supra note 190, 2010 WL 5301044, at *5-*7 (describing "greenmailing").
591
See supra note 506 (defining a "bulldog provision").
592
See, e.g., China Res. Dev. Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 12 (Jan. 14, 2011).
593
See, e.g., supra note 504 and accompanying text (discussing 57th St.'s new, high
conversion threshold).
594
See, e.g., Wittlin & Ferris, supra note 241 ("The key structural modification [to the
SPAC], . . . is the elimination of the stockholder vote requirement for a proposed acquisition.").
595
See, e.g., Neuhauser, supra note 367 ("[T]he elimination of the shareholder vote was a
huge step in the right direction.").
596
Albert Hirschman offers the classic description of two prominent strategies in EXIT,
VOICE, AND LOYALTY, where he describes the choice confronting a consumer: to voice
complaints or to stop using the product. See generally HIRSCHMAN, supra note 56, at 4.
Hirschman's insight has often been cited in corporate scholarship to describe the choices
confronting shareholders and plaintiffs in a securities class. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 293 n.11 (2010)
(noting that Hirschman coined the terms "exit" and "voice" to describe "rival strategies for
influencing large organizations"). But, as the foregoing discussion makes clear, principals do not
confront a binary choice of voice and exit when seeking protection from agency costs: they are but
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We have seen the holdout (i.e. "greenmailing") problems discussed above,
which a supermajority vote creates. But if granting shareholders a vote on
an acquisition remained important in competing for the dollars of potential
investors, SPAC sponsors could still have easily offered investors a
conversion threshold of 50%—that is, a simple majority vote. The sponsors
of latter-day SPACs, however, denied their investors any approval vote at
all—at least as a matter of right.597 From Table 4 above, we see that the de
facto veto provided by the conversion threshold has moved up to an average
of 75.2% in the most recent SPACs.
The SPACs' shift from promising a supermajority vote to promising
no vote at all may seem surprising. If the vote had value, it certainly would
have been retained because of the presence of a highly competitive market.598
SPACs contain a limited number of built-in characteristics, and so can
compete only based in particular on the identity of their managers599 and the
particular level of investor protections they offer.600 Because the SPAC
marketplace is an arena of survival of the fittest, we surmise investors truly
do not attach importance to the vote, given their willingness to accept the
tender offer instead.601
The reason that SPACs eliminated initially robust voting rights is
clear from the data: the trust account has taken their place as the primary
protection mechanism for SPAC investors.602 Ever-increasing amounts have
been put into trust, from 85% to amounts approaching (or even greater than)

two of many strategies principals can use.
597
See SCG Fin. Acquisition Corp., Form S-1/A, supra note 571, at 20. SCG Financial
Acquisition Corp. stated that it would not offer the vote option at all, unless required by law or
deemed advisable by the sponsors. Id. If a vote occurred, a simple majority would be enough to
approve the acquisition. See id. What is important is that the vote is no longer a promised
protection; instead it is a mere possibility, available only at the discretion of the managers. Id.
598
See ICR to Host, supra note 537 (listing some of players in the industry).
599
See supra notes 562-65 and accompanying text (explaining the "bet on the jockey"
theory).
600
See Heyman, supra note 401, at 540 (stating that SPACs "have enough wiggle room to
alter the structure in ways that make it attractive to investors").
601
See, e.g., supra note 208 and accompanying text (stating that the tender offer is an
alternative to voting). The initial SPAC template was negotiated not just between SPAC promoters
and investors. The SEC was a necessary intermediary—if the promoters could not convince the
SEC regulators that the offering was fair to investors, it would not go forward. See Order, supra
note 190, 2010 WL 5301044, at *5-*7 (showing the SEC's concern for shareholder protection in the
SPAC context); see also Heyman, supra note 401, at 540 ("[T]he SEC does not perceive [SPACs]
as a scam in need of being caught within a wider or more tightly woven regulatory net."). This
accounts for the "belt and suspenders" style investor protections that characterize the early SPACs.
See, e.g., Riemer, supra note 45, at 954-55 (stating these protections)
602
See supra Part VII.B.
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100%.603 Furthermore, SPACs have often obtained guarantees from their
investment banks604 or sponsors605 to ensure that the trust account would be
safe from third-party claims.606 Put simply, the trust account is nearly as
good as gold; until an acquisition occurs, it offers the shareholder a means of
withdrawing from the venture at a cost no more than de minimis.607 With
such robust exit rights, the vote is a mere superfluity.608 Granting it only
subjects the sponsors, and the entity as a whole, to unnecessary risks of
mounting transaction costs and delay.609
The complete elimination of the SPAC vote deepens our
understanding of shareholder votes in other contexts. In order for a vote to
be effective, the voters must be able to separately or collectively monitor
their agent, agree on a proposed course of action, and coordinate a

603

See supra notes 520-23 and accompanying text (discussing the high percentages of
capital that must be in trust account).
604
See, e.g., Sapphire Indus. Corp., Amendment No. 3 to Registration Statement (Form S1/A), at 24 (Dec. 28, 2007), stating:
While we will seek to have all vendors and service providers (which would include
any third parties we engaged to assist us in any way in connection with our search
for a target business or businesses) and prospective target businesses execute
agreements with us waiving any right, title, interest or claim of any kind they may
have in or to any monies held in the trust account, there is no guarantee that they
will execute such agreements. Nor is there any guarantee that, even if such entities
execute such agreements with us, they will not seek recourse against the trust
account or that a court would not conclude that such agreements are not legally
enforceable. Lazard has agreed to have personal liability to ensure that the
proceeds in the trust account are not reduced by the claims of target businesses or
claims of vendors or other entities that are owed money by us for services rendered
or contracted for or products sold to us. However, it may not be able to satisfy
those obligations, if it is required to do so. Furthermore, Lazard will not have any
personal liability as to any claimed amounts owed to a third party who executed a
waiver (including a prospective target business or businesses).
605
See, e.g., China Res. Dev. Inc., Amendment No. 6 to Registration Statement (Form S1/A), at 16 (June 2, 2011) ("Robin Lee has contractually agreed that, if we liquidate prior to the
consummation of a business combination, he will be personally liable to ensure that the proceeds in
the trust account are not reduced by the claims of target businesses or claims of vendors or other
entities that are owed money by us for services rendered or contracted for or products sold to us.").
606
See supra note 519 and accompanying text.
607
See Riemer, supra note 45, at 960 (discussing pre-2008 SPACs, but emphasizing the
still accurate point that investors have little to lose).
608
See supra Part VII.B.
609
See Wittlin & Ferris, supra note 241, at 2-3 ("The combination of hedge funds starved for
cash and hedge funds with a 'yield to trust' strategy made obtaining stockholder approval of
acquisitions extremely difficult for SPACs. Uncertainty regarding the outcome of the
stockholder vote discouraged potential acquisition targets from pursing discussions with SPACs.").
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response.610 The costs of collective action are low when there are a limited
number of decision makers.611 Public corporations, in contrast, feature
countless shareholders who confront a classic collective action problem.612
As many corporate scholars have noted, public corporation shareholders face
problems of incentive and effectiveness when trying to use their voting
power to discipline agents.613 The difficulty is so great that today's
conventional wisdom is that shareholders should follow the "Wall Street
Rule" and exit, rather than exercise their voice at all.614
A recent theory of voting in mutual funds proposed by John Morley
and Quinn Curtis has complicated the notion of exit and the "Wall Street
Rule." Morley and Curtis argue that exit is easier in mutual funds than in
publicly traded corporations, and that therefore mutual fund shareholders
have less incentive to make use of the vote than do their public corporation
counterparts.615 That is, whatever limited value the shareholder vote has in a
public corporation, it will have even less importance in a mutual fund, which
is in effect even more liquid than a public corporation because it trades on
asset value, rather than on an expectation of future cash flows.616
Morley and Curtis offer theoretical arguments as to why voting mutual
fund shareholders, with their robust exit right, are relatively less likely to
make use of the vote.617 SPACs' elimination of the acquisition vote offers
empirical proof of their claim that stronger exit rights lessen the importance
of a vote.618 We present actual data indicating that a stronger exit right

610

See Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing
Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 Yale L.J. 269, 271 (2003) ("The dispersed shareholder
body is poorly positioned to engage in effective collective action; the costs of monitoring
management or leading a proxy contest typically far outweigh the benefits to an individual
shareholder. As a result, shareholder collective action is rare, even though it may benefit
shareholders as a group.").
611
John Armour et al., Agency Problems, Legal Strategies, and Enforcement, 4 (European
Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 135, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1436555 ("Multiple principals will face coordination costs, which will
inhibit their ability to engage in collective action.").
612
See Choi & Fisch, supra 610, at 271.
613
Beginning at least as far back as Berle and Means in 1932. ADOLF A. BERLE &
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 252 (Harcourt,
Brace & World, Inc. rev. ed. 1968) (1932).
614
Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 129, 130
(2009).
615
Morley & Curtis, supra note 61, at 89-90.
616
Id. at 84.
617
See id. at 89-90.
618
See supra Part VII.B.
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correlates to less shareholder interest in a vote.619 Thus the SPAC story,
important in its own right, also offers insight into larger questions of contract
design.
IX. CONCLUSION
The story of SPACs is a story of legal innovation. This Article has
provided the first detailed picture of how SPACs have changed over time.
Using an original dataset, we documented the contours of this exciting new
corporate form. The SPAC story has importance in its own right. We traced
it in detail, describing how SPACs attempted to reshape the private equity
mold to the public market. SPACs borrowed much from the private equity
contract, most notably by using incentive compensation to align managers'
interest with those of shareholders, and imposing a time limit on managers'
use of funds.
SPAC's original contract design proved to be flawed because SPAC
entrepreneurs miscalculated the importance of reputation. Without the potent
reputational constraints the clubby world of private equity afforded,
managers could no longer claim an unfettered 20% of the profits or omit for
long the 1% "skin in the game" that traditional private equity managers
contribute. Correspondingly, opportunistic hedge funds were free to extort
concessions from SPAC managers, unhampered by the fear that they were
risking a chance at future investments. The SPAC form evolved to respond
to this danger, but then went one step further and largely eliminated the vote
on an acquisition. This development contributes to recent literature by
deepening our understanding of the relationship between voice and exit.
The SPAC experience highlights that some exits are cheaper than others and
suggests that, if the exit is easy enough, a vote may not matter at all.

619

See supra Tables 1-4.

